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INTRODUCTION

The term “remix” is used mainly in a digital context, although there is
nothing inherently digital about remix. For instance, fan fiction, a widely
discussed form of remix, has developed into an important cultural
phenomenon in the past forty years, clearly exhibiting a non-digital
incubation period.1 Nevertheless, the digital revolution has been
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School (Yale Law School, J.D.; University
of Chicago, M.A.; University of Illinois at Chicago, Ph.D.). I would like to gratefully acknowledge
the research assistance of Justin Shuler and Nicole Soussan, the administrative assistance of Susan
Button, and the editorial assistance of the staff of the Florida Law Review. I would also like to
thank all those colleagues who have made construtive comments in all the various fora in which
aspects of the arguments developed here were earlier presented.
1. See generally HENRY JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS 162–77 (1992); Rebecca Tushnet,
Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651
1275
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transformational because the dramatic decrease in cost and ease of use of
digital tools combined with a massive increase in availability of digital
content to use as fodder for remixing has resulted in an explosion in the
production of remix works.2
Remix is a development of great cultural importance. Speaking purely
aesthetically, digital remix allows for easy blending of genres of content—
music, video, text, photos, etc. not previously possible. Thus, not only is
there the promise of more content from new sources but also wholly new
forms of content. Leading media theorist Henry Jenkins aptly refers to the
result as “convergence culture.”3 Politically speaking, remix facilitates
democratic participation in the creation of culture to an extent not seen
since the mega-media titans took over cultural production nearly a century
ago.4 That this creative work is produced and shared by millions of
everyday people cannot help but have desirable broad ramifications, as a
variety of commentators have noted.5
Digital remix is fraught with legal implications as well. On the one
hand, it is a significant new source of original content, and accordingly, its
emergence serves the fundamental goal of copyright, which is
conventionally said to be the promotion of creative work.6 On the other
(1997) (discussing the increased use of fan fiction).
2. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459,
1500–03 (“Web 2.0 applications now allow ordinary people to create expressive works of their own
and to share them immediately with millions of others. In a recent Deloitte survey of 2,000 Internet
users ranging in age from thirteen to seventy-five, close to half said they had created content—
blogs, music, photos, videos, and Web sites—for others to view online. In 2008, the number of
blogs alone exceeded 112 million (although some may not be active). Nearly seventy percent of the
people polled said they viewed the UGC of others.”); see also Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of
UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 870
(2009).
3. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 16
(2006). The roots of remix are in collage and thus can be traced back to one of Picasso’s early
periods. See Tate, Glossary: Collage, http://www.tate.org.uk/collections/glossary/definition.jsp?ent
ryId=70 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010); Guggenheim Collection, Collage, http://www.guggenheimcol
lection.org/site/concept_Collage.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). Linguistic convention has yet to
settle on one term. In usages roughly synonymous with the term, “remix,” one sees “user-generated
content,” “UGC,” “mash-ups,” and “appropriation art.” To further the confusion, but hopefully for a
point, I will introduce the term “amateur-generated content,” for reasons that will become apparent.
4. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 135–37.
5. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID
ECONOMY 67 (2008) (explaining the democratic effects of read/write culture; id. (“For those of us
who are not Posner and not Gil, the Internet is the one context that encourages the ethic of
democracy that they exemplify. It is the place where all writing gets to be RW. To write in this
medium is to know that anything one writes is open to debate.”); Lee, supra note 2, at 1504 (“UGC
greatly facilitates both the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.”); Tushnet, supra note 1,
at 655–58 (explaining the personal utility derived from fan created fiction).
6. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); see Rebecca
Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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hand, because creating remix requires digital content as raw material, and
much of this will naturally be owned by others and used without their
(express authorized) consent, the issue of copyright infringement arises
naturally.
By the lights of a number of commentators, copyright law, at least in its
current manifestation in the United States, is ill-suited to optimally regulate
remix. Perhaps the most pervasive and troubling fear expressed among
theorists is the potential for a “chilling effect” on the production of
remix—particularly amateur remix—caused by a lethal combination of
unenforceable legal doctrine and well-funded, aggressive corporate content
owners.7 To the extent that this concern for chilling effects is wellgrounded, the issue is raised as to how copyright law might be altered in
order to better regulate the exploding phenomenon that is remix. In this
Article, I consider three alternatives. The first alternative is developed by
leading Internet theorist Lawrence Lessig in an important and wellregarded recent book aptly entitled, Remix.8 Quite strikingly, he argues that
remix should be legalized.9 I will develop an alternative policy proposal
that is equally, if not more, sweeping in its scope but which is also more
practical and which coheres better with other aspects of copyright policy.
The form of my argument has both positive and normative components.
The positive legal argument is that, properly understood, amateur remix is
predominantly fair use already.10 As such, it is legal already, not just at the
margin but in the main. Thus, one of the three ways to legalize remix
discussed in this Article is simply to provide the correct legal analysis—the
legal truth shall set these unauthorized users free. Implicit in this claim, but
worth noting explicitly, is the fact that while Lessig seeks to develop new
policy for all remix, my concern is amateur-generated remix. The
importance of drawing this distinction will become apparent in the course
of this Article.
With regard to the normative argument, I will suggest that copyright
law should abandon its sole reliance on a strict liability standard for
infringement and instead incorporate a tripartite liability standard, as is the
513, 517 (2009).
7. Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer
Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 963, 966 (2009) (“Because fan fiction and remix works
build upon preexisting commercial works, typically without authorization, these latter works are
potentially subject to infringement liability. Not surprisingly, creators of fan fiction and remix
sometimes live in fear that their creations will cause them to be sued. This is bound to have, as the
phrase goes, a ‘chilling effect’ on these creators.”). See generally Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (involving issuance of a takedown notice regarding a video
of a YouTube member’s child dancing to a Prince song); LESSIG, supra note 5 (explaining the
increase in copyright litigation both in the United States and Europe).
8. LESSIG, supra note 5 (discussing why our current copyright laws need to be changed).
9. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 254 (“[W]e need to restore a copyright law that leaves ‘amateur
creativity’ free from regulation.”).
10. To lay my jurisprudential cards on the table, here I am adopting a Holmesian standard of
law as a prediction of what courts will do. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
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case in tort law generally. Most important, I will argue that a fault standard
will often be the appropriate standard to apply in the context of amateur
digital remix. This proposed expansion in applicable liability standards
will involve a rethinking of the normative desiderata that undergird
copyright. There was a time when copyright policy was, in effect, treated
as a form of industrial policy. Professor Jessica Litman has set out in detail
the manner by which the 1976 Copyright Act was predominantly shaped by
the set of relevant industry actors most likely to be financially impacted.11
The story is that Congress largely accepted the set of rules that resulted
from this modus vivendi of the combined content industries.12 In other
words, the Copyright Act is aptly viewed as an instance of industrial policy
set into law by a compliant Congress. One of the ancillary conclusions
from the following discussion is that viewing the ambit of copyright
appropriately regulated as industrial policy can no longer be justified—if it
ever was—in the new media landscape in which great numbers of everyday
technology users have become what commentators refer to as
“creator/consumers.”13
The monolithic economic framework that typically undergirds
industrial policy is simply inadequate to correspond to the normative
complexity that emerges when millions of everyday citizens are directly
11. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR.
L. REV. 275 (1989) (discussing how historically copyright legislation has been formed by affected
interest groups bargaining among themselves).
12. See Tim Hering, Comment, Users and Abusers: Has the Distinction Been Legislated out
of Copyright?, 83 OR. L. REV. 1349, 1356–59 (2004). Hering describes the 1911 lawsuit
surrounding the motion picture industry’s release of Ben Hur, a film based on a General Lew
Wallace book. Id. at 1357. The Supreme Court found in favor of the publisher, causing the movie
industry to seek a change in copyright law. The movie industry then put forth a bill to amend the
Copyright Act in 1912. Id. There was initially little common ground between interested industry
groups. The House of Representatives responded by encouraging industry parties “to negotiate
privately and return with what they thought would be a fair solution.” Id. In March of that year, the
parties came to an agreement and subsequently submitted a proposal to the House. Id. “[D]espite
concerns over some of the proposals in the new bill, it was enacted with only minor changes.” Id.
Hering explains that, “It is under this method of interest group wrangling that the current copyright
statute was born.” Id. at 1359. He adds that the 1976 Copyright Act “bore some of the same
hallmarks of its predecessor [the 1909 Copyright Act]: the Act’s provisions spoke to the narrow
interests of individual copyright owners rather than to the general guiding principles of copyright.”
Id.
13. Steven A. Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One—
Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 863, 875–76 (2008) (“The credo of modern
art is art for art’s sake; this is UGC for UGC’s sake. There may be important implications of this
fact for core issues of copyright as copyright assumes that people create due to the incentive
provided by legal protections afforded by copyright law. Ergo, if no incentive is needed because
people are motivated for art’s sake—so to speak, to create UGC—then the protections afforded by
copyright law may be unnecessary . . . .”). See generally Jacqueline D. Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight
Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SS
RN_ID1597757_code691672.pdf?abstractid=1574460&mirid=1 (Select “One-Click Download”
link) (noting the blurring lines between consumers and creators).
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and significantly impacted by policies such as those that govern amateur
remix. In particular, I will argue that owners of copyprotected works
should no longer have the right to prevail in infringement suits against
amateur remixers simply by establishing unauthorized copying of protected
content (at least when the facts suggest a lack of “substantial certainty” of
injury of a sort required for an intentional tort).14 The justification for this
doctrinal shift will be derived by applying the sort of fairness arguments
that have won the day—or rather, the modern era—in tort generally.
Introducing elemental fairness concerns in this context will be seen to have
classical adherents as ideologically diverse as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., on the one hand, and Justice Benjamin Cardozo, on the other,
and contemporary adherents as ideologically diverse as Judge Richard
Posner and Professor William Landes, on the one hand, and Professors
Jules Coleman, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, on the other
hand.15 As will be shown, taking fairness seriously in this manner has the
salutary effect of mitigating or eliminating the purported “chilling effects”
from the threat of infringement liability for the preponderance of amateur
digital content, although this will be a (welcome) consequence of, rather
than a justification for, taking fairness seriously.16
The connection between taking fairness seriously and legalization of
remix is as follows: The implication of applying a fault standard to
putatively tortious behavior is that such behavior, sans negligence, is
perfectly legal. The digital realm is united with the physical realm in which
driving a car is legal so long as one does not negligently injure another.
Thus, we have our third route to legalization of remix—the first, espoused
by Lessig; the second, implicit in a proper understanding of fair use
doctrine as applied to amateur digital remixing activities in the main; and a
third, implicit in the policy proposal to expand and modernize the liability
standard in copyright infringement.
Part I of this Article will examine Lessig’s proposal to legalize remix.
Part II will set out the first stage for the competing policy proposal to
expand the number of liability standards in copyright by examining the
broader theoretical connections between copyright infringement and tort
liability generally. Part III will distill these top-down theoretical insights
into a form applicable to a fair use analysis of amateur digital remix. The
importance of this examination will be seen in Part IV, as the legal fact that
14. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). On the duty
toward unforeseeable victims, the court wrote:
One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing
without more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not
willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so many
and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the
harm was unintended.
Id.
16. For a discussion of these chilling effects, see Chilling Effects Clearinghouse,
http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
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amateur digital content is predominantly a fair use is essential to
understanding both why Lessig’s proposal fails and why the alternative
succeeds.17
I. LESSIG’S ARGUMENT FOR LEGALIZING REMIX
Lessig’s overall policy position on remix follows from his view that
remix is in essence a victimless crime and moreover one with important
social benefits. Under this set of assumptions, it is not surprising that
Lessig is able to reach the conclusion that legal rules should support rather
than impede remix culture to the full extent of legalizing the activity.18
Lessig focuses on music mash-ups to make this point. He discusses the
music mash-up artist, Girl Talk, who told Lessig in an interview that he
could not understand why anyone would want to stop his music, since
unlike “bootlegging,” it was not hurting anyone.19 Lessig notes, “Why
anyone ‘should’ was a question I couldn’t answer.”20 As this statement
indicates, Lessig can discern no harm from the activity such that anyone
would want to stop it. Indeed, throughout the book, Lessig fails to
acknowledge any harm that might result from remix. Silencio non est
disputandum. Lessig instead emphasizes the manner in which remix
culture creates social benefits. Lessig supports this final assumption
through a variety of remarks. He claims that,
[Remix] touches social life differently. It gives the
audience something more. Or better, it asks something more
of the audience. It is offered as a draft. It invites a response. In
a culture in which it is common, its citizens develop a kind of
knowledge that empowers as much as it informs or
entertains.21
Combining the above premises, Lessig derives the policy conclusion that
remix cultural practices should not be impeded but instead supported by
legal rules.22
As the previous argument indicates, Lessig’s policy conclusion about
remix turns crucially on his claim that remix is criminal. Lessig fails to
acknowledge, however, that this claim is contestable. Therefore, it will be
necessary to look in depth at the set of arguments Lessig offers to support
his understanding of remix as criminal activity. If Lessig is right, we are in
the midst of a crime wave on a massive scale—one that has a generational
17. For an account of regulation through more informal means, see Steven A. Hetcher, Using
Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1874–91
(2009).
18. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 254 (“[W]e need to restore a copy right law that leaves
‘amateur creativity’ free from regulation.”); see also text accompanying note 9.
19. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 13.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 85.
22. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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component. On Lessig’s account, it is young people, “kids,” who are by
and large a generation of criminals.23 Lessig is sympathetic, viewing these
“kids” as victims of the era in which they have come of age.24 Note,
moreover, that since it is the emergence of ever easier to use technologies
that is creating a secular trend toward this brand of criminal behavior, a
sobering implication of Lessig’s argument is that future generations of kids
will be increasingly inclined toward a life of crime.
Lessig’s assumption that the rising kids of this generation are criminals
itself follows from two assumptions: first, that unauthorized remixing of
online digital content is criminal; and second, that the rising generation of
kids use their computers largely for remixing activities. Regarding both
assumptions, Lessig writes,
In a world in which technology begs all of us to create and
spread creative work differently from how it was created and
spread before, what kind of moral platform will sustain our
kids, when their ordinary behavior is deemed criminal? Who
will they become? What other crimes will to them seem
natural?25
In a statement that highlights the second assumption, Lessig claims that
we should “reform the rules that render criminal most of what your kids do
with their computers.”26
Lessig further argues that turning kids into criminals will have
deleterious effects on them and on society, as kids will learn to disrespect
the law and consequently engage in more criminal activities.27 Lessig
writes,
I worry about the effect this war is having upon our kids.
What is this war doing to them? Whom is it making them?
How is it changing how they think about normal, rightthinking behavior? What does it mean to a society when a
whole generation is raised as criminals?28
Lessig goes so far as to suggest that this generational turn toward crime
may become dangerous: “I then want to spotlight the damage we’re not
thinking enough about—the harm to a generation from rendering criminal
what comes naturally to them. What does it do to them? What do they then
do to us?”29
Comparing remixing to file-sharing, Lessig asks,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

LESSIG, supra note 5, at xvii.
Id. at xviii.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at xvii.
Id.
Id. at 18.
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Should we continue the expulsions from universities? The
threat of multimillion-dollar civil judgments? Should we
increase the vigor with which we wage war against these
“terrorists”? Should we sacrifice ten or a hundred to a federal
prison (for their actions under current law are felonies), so
that others learn to stop what today they do with everincreasing frequency?30
Lessig argues that the criminal status of remix has other deleterious
social consequences as well, such as deterring the development of new
forms of literacy. He argues,
[T]he law as it stands now will stanch the development of the
institutions of literacy that are required if this literacy is to
spread. Schools will shy away, since this remix is
presumptively illegal. Businesses will be shy, since rights
holders are still eager to use the law to threaten new uses.31
Reasonably taking it as the implicit premise that institutions of literacy
should not be deterred, Lessig concludes that laws against remix culture
should be dispensed with in order to avoid these undesirable outcomes.
As each of the above instances indicates, the cornerstone of Lessig’s
overall argument is the claim that amateur remix is criminal activity. Thus,
it is essential to determine the accuracy of Lessig’s legal analysis of remix
because if he is wrong regarding its criminality, then there may be no
reason to fear the undesirable social consequences he foretells. I will argue
that Lessig’s claim that amateur remix is criminal is incorrect. In Part III, I
will argue that this is true for the simple reason that significant amounts
and types of remix works are in fact fair uses. A use that is fair is not an
infringement and a fortiori not a criminal infringement. 32 In order to fully
appreciate the role of fair use in this argument and subsequently in the
proffered alternative, it will be necessary to engage in some fundamental
analysis into the theoretical underpinnings of copyright infringement.
30. Id. at xviii.
31. Id. at 108.
32. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing that fair use does not constitute
copyright infringement). Moreover, even if remix sometimes failed to qualify as fair use, there is a
strong argument that the creators of these works will not be subject to criminal liability under the
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act because remix work would rarely meet the $1,000 threshold value
and in many cases the work’s owner would have difficulty proving there was willful infringement
as required under the statute. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1899–990 & n.114. Lessig does not discuss
the NET Act despite the fact that it added criminal provisions for non-commercial activities and
thus on its face is salient in the context of remix, much of which is non-commercial. As stated in
Using Social Norms, “Lessig’s frequent references to the criminalization of a generation imply a
belief that these remixers do, or will, violate the NET Act.” Id. at 1899–1900 n.114; see, e.g.,
LESSIG, supra note 5, at 283–84 (arguing that children have been branded “pirates” and comparing
them to Soviet “black marketeers”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss5/4

8

Hetcher: The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Standard to Amat

2010] THE KIDS ARE ALRIGHT: APPLYING A FAULT LIABILITY STANDARD TO AMATEUR DIGITAL REMIX

1283

Next, it will be clarifying to provide the first stage of the two-stage
argument that will be propounded as an alternative to Lessig’s proposal
that remix be legalized. This first stage provides an argument for changing
the liability standard in copyright. Once this position has been developed,
discussion will then return to the topic of fair use in the context of amateur
remix. The connection between these strands of argument is that it turns
out that remix is the factual setting that is most supportive of the need for a
tripartite liability standard, as it is in the context of amateur remix that fair
use goes from being the exception to being the rule. I will argue that this
shift has direct implications for the relevance of applying a fault standard
because unauthorized uses in this context are no longer substantial
certainties but instead mere risks.
II. COPYTORT & AMATEUR DIGITAL REMIX
I coin the term “copytort” to make a point about what I see as the lack
of sophistication in copyright theorizing with regard to certain issues that
are only best understood by bringing to bear elements of tort law and
theory. In short, copytort is copyright that takes tort seriously. The
following discussion will only develop as much copytort theory as is
necessary for the present purpose, namely, the development of a more
sophisticated understanding of amateur digital remix. In the concluding
remarks, I will indicate some directions in which copytort, understood as a
top-down theoretical approach, can be, and should be, further developed.
This is in keeping with a methodological approach first developed
elsewhere.33
Part II.A below will draw some basic connections between tort and
copyright. Part II.B will then discuss the emergence of the fault standard in
tort law generally and the normative evolution in tort law that brought
about this emergence. Part II.C will then focus on abnormally dangerous
activities, as they have traditionally served as an exception to the fault
liability rule in tort generally, and thus, the issue arises as to whether
copyright infringement is especially deserving of this minority rule for
parallel reasons.
Finally, the last Part II.D will examine trespass to land, which has often
been invoked as an apt comparison when the strict liability rule is invoked
in copyright.34
A. Background Connections Between Tort and Copyright
Copyright infringement is a tort.35 In light of this uncontroversial legal
fact, it is odd that, as a practical matter, copyright and tort law have little to
33. See generally STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (2004) (arguing that
legislators must consider social norms in order to effectively create copyright laws).
34. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit
Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 66–68 (2009).
35. “Courts have long recognized that infringement of a copyright is a tort, and all persons
concerned therein are jointly and severally liable as such joint tort-feasors.” Ted Browne Music Co.
v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923).
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do with one another on an overt, doctrinal level. Lawyers are not typically
taught to see the tort-related aspects of copyright. This claim is verified by
the fact that copyright casebooks say little with regard to tort and tort
casebooks say little with regard to copyright.36 This lack of conceptual
overlap is unfortunate, however, as confusion may result. For instance, by
failing to recognize copyright infringement as within the ambit of tort, tort
scholars make statements about tort generally that would not be so
obviously true were they to explicitly include copyright into the underlying
subject matter under purview. For example, tort commentators sometimes
note that recovery for pure economic loss is restricted in tort.37 Copyright
infringement is presumably not considered when these comments are
made. Recovery for economic loss is a core remedy in copyright, along
with statutory damages.38 It is clear, then, that failing to take notice of
copyright infringement carries the potential to lead astray commentary on
tort. We will see that the reverse is true as well—that copyright can benefit
from incorporating a more sophisticated understanding of tort law.
The first issue is whether there might be a sound explanation for the
disconnect between copyright and tort. One possible explanation for why
tort and copyright are not much discussed together is because the former is
a common law creation while the latter is a statutory creation. If this is the
explanation, it is curious to note that standard definitions of tort do not
include a common law origin as essential.39 A tort is aptly described as an
injury for which civil redress is available.40 Such civil redress could come
via statute instead of common law, however. In short, the fact that tort
happened to emerge in the common law is no reason to think that such
emergence is essential to tort. It is basic philosophical error to mistake
coincident features with essential features.41 Punitive damage caps are
perhaps the most important instance of this phenomenon.42 Once again, the
36. For example, the dominant casebook in tort, Prosser, contains no copyright cases, nor is
copyright infringement an entry in the book’s index. Nor do the indices of leading copyright
casebooks contain entries for core tort concepts such as “fault” or “negligence.”
37. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 268 (6th ed. 1996) (noting that “the courts have not protected economic interests as
extensively as those involving physical security of [a] person and property . . .”).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006) (providing the remedies for copyright infringement include the
copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer or statutory damages).
39. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 14 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining “[t]ort law need not be judicial in
origin”). The authors then give a series of examples of statutes creating and defining the “general
parameters of tort liability.” Id.
40. Id. at 3 (“In sum, to commit a tort is to act in a manner that the law deems wrongful
toward and injurious to another, such that the other gains a right to bring a lawsuit to obtain relief
from the wrongdoer (or tortfeasor). Torts in turn refers to a collection of named and relatively welldefined legal wrongs that, when committed, generate a right of action in the victim against the
wrongdoer.”).
41. Cf. Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex,
62 FLA. L. REV. 895, 908 (“[C]orrelation is not causation . . . .”).
42. See generally American Tort Reform Association, Punitive Damages Reform,
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reverse is true as well; important copyright doctrines have emerged through
common law processes. This is true for two of the most important and
contentious doctrines in American copyright law: the doctrine of fair use
and the set of doctrines that together make up indirect or secondary
infringement.43 The overall point is that just as tort law is becoming more
statutory, copyright law has a longer, more diverse history as a common
law phenomenon than is commonly noted. Thus, any seeming common law
versus statutory law divergence in origin between the two appears not to
provide a conceptual basis for failing to seek a richer synthesis of tort and
copyright.
Another possible explanation is that these two areas of the law have
little in common because the underlying subject matter is fundamentally
different. Traditional tort concerns things tangible while copyright
concerns things intangible. Tort law at its core is about sticks and stones
and breaking bones while copyright is about the evanescent notions of
unauthorized use of intangible expression. These types of property may
reasonably be thought to obey fundamentally different laws. As property
scholars going back to John Locke have long noted, a fundamental
defining feature of property is scarcity.44 By contrast, creative works have
no natural scarcity; once they exist, they exist for all unless copyright law,
encryption, or some other means of creating an artificial scarcity can be
devised.45 Thus, while copyright infringement may be a tort in some formal
sense, yet, in practical terms, the divergent characteristics of tangible
versus intangible property may mean that copyright and tort have little in
common. On closer inspection, however, this argument is faulty. Tort has
long protected intangible interests such as reputation and privacy.46 Thus,
the distinction between tangible and intangible interests does not provide a
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7343 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (illustrating the
various states’ statutory tort reform with respect to punitive damages).
43. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1911) (recognizing a form of
contributory copyright infringement); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4,901) (establishing the common law doctrine of fair use); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3] (rev. ed. 2010) (discussing the longstanding
common law origins of contributory infringement).
44. Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of
Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1258–59 (2000) (“Property is scarce. Real property is
finite, and while opportunities to increase the total amount of personal property are being
continuously discovered, individuals have access to, at any one time, a limited amount of personal
property.”); see JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: THE SECOND TREATISE 24 (Wildside Press
2008).
45. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 58–59 (2001) (explaining that, “[I]nformation is naturally nonrivalrous. If you use it, I still
have as much left as before. It is also naturally nonexcludable.”). In turn, the law creates a
monopoly right to remedy this problem. See also Hetcher, supra note 7, at 975 (“Creative works are
non-rival in their consumption in as much as consumption by one person does not mean there is any
less—of a book, for instance—to be consumed by another person.”).
46. See, e.g., 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59 (1977) (discussing tort law
protection of reputation under the cause of action for defamation); id. § 652A (discussing tort law
protection of privacy from invasions of privacy).
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rationale for jettisoning the project of seeking a better integration of tort
and copyright.
Surely, it is evidence that better integration is needed when one
considers that a core battle in tort jurisprudence between the economists,
the corrective justice theorists, and the civil recourse theorists47 finds
almost no echo in copyright law. Yet the distinctions that divide these
theorists48 would appear to have purchase in copyright as well.49 For
example, to the extent that the purpose of tort is to allow victims of injuries
to seek corrective justice for their injuries, a parallel justification would
easily translate to copyright infringement—namely, the private cause of
action for infringement provided by the statute can be seen as providing a
mechanism for owners of infringed upon works to seek corrective justice
or civil recourse for the wrong done to them.50
We see, then, that the jurisprudence of copyright is insufficiently finegrained. There is an important debate in tort regarding the possibility that
private tort suits as a whole are inefficient such that it would be welfare
maximizing to administrate injuries in a different manner altogether, such
as a social insurance system of the sort maintained in New Zealand.
Coleman, for instance, has defended a corrective justice account of tort
liability, and yet is open to a New Zealand model as well.51 For Goldberg
and Zipursky, by contrast, the right to seek civil redress for private wrongs
is at the core of what tort is about, and thus, it would not be an alternative
to move to a system such as the New Zealand model that by-passes the
availability of private redress.52 The obvious question is raised: say, if
Goldberg and Zipursky are right, doesn’t this entail that the civil recourse
47. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
695–99 (2003).
48. See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1540 n.48 (2006) (construing that civil recourse theorists assert that “[a]
private right of action against another person . . . exists only where the defendant has committed a
legal wrong against the plaintiff and thus violated her legal right” as overbroad (quoting Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998)));
Zipursky, supra, at 56 (“This point applies in the context of every kind of tort. Someone who uses
another’s property without consent, absent some justification, has trespassed and invaded another’s
legal rights in his property whether or not she ultimately compensates him.”).
49. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (explaining how copyright law should promote
efficient allocation of resources).
50. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 324–26 (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 2–3 (1999). See generally Jules Coleman & Arthur
Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995) (arguing that tort law instantiates a
political conception of fair loss allocation).
51. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1501, 1515 (2002) (“Rather, it is to note that the later Coleman, armed with a deep and subtle
appreciation of tort as a practice tied to a conception of justice, is no less anxious than the early
Coleman to avoid embracing tort. Even as he now gingerly embraces tort, Coleman is looking past
it, eyeing New Zealand, wondering whether we ought to be there instead.”).
52. Id. at 1517 (“Tort and its underlying principle of corrective justice are ours; we are stuck
with them, and we are left to explain and understand them.”).
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rationale be applied to copyright as well? And if not, why not? The
question is whether copyright infringement might as well be administered
as a social insurance system rather than by means of private causes of
action. If copyright is to become more normatively sophisticated, it must
take these sorts of debates to heart. Currently, copyright law does not do
so. Instead, it presents a normatively flat world in which all policy
questions reduce to determining the proper scope of the property right. The
justification as to why copyright owners are given a private cause of action
and the details of what this remedy provides are justified in terms of social
welfare.53 By contrast, the whole point of tort is to ask a sort of normative
question that is more subtle such that its answer does not directly implicate
particular theories of property. To better appreciate this distinction, note
that the debates that divide, say, corrective justice theorists from
economists or even from one another do not typically reduce to squabbles
regarding, for example, whether one is a Lockean property theorist or not.
Consider next a second and perhaps more fundamental failure of
copyright doctrine to address the level of sophistication found in tort
generally. The failure can again be discerned most straightforwardly by
looking at the structure of casebooks in tort, which traditionally divide up
the subject matter according to the tripartite liability standards of
intentional torts, negligence torts, and strict liability torts.54 Once this core
distinction is noted, an interesting fact becomes immediately apparent,
namely, that this tripartite liability structure does not carry over into
copyright. As is stated, de rigeur, by courts and commentators, copyright
infringement is a strict liability tort.55 Not only is it a strict liability tort, but
this fact appears to be taken for granted. Tort casebooks typically seek to
provide some sort of policy rationale for the three standards.56 By contrast,
it is typical in copyright to simply state the fact that infringement is a strict
liability standard, without further explanation.
53. The instrumentalist justification for doing so is that the property rights will provide
stronger protection to owners in a regime in which the owners will have a legal means to pursue
infringers and thus hopefully deter the infringements in the first place. On an economic/utilitarian
justificatory model, all rationales in the end are public—e.g., serving the greater good, public
welfare, etc. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1445–48 (1989). As
such, on this model, a private cause of action such as granted under § 501 is viewed as allowing
owners to function as private attorneys general. The logic of giving the enforcement right to the
owner of the property right is based on the venerable and plausible assumption that individuals tend
to act so as to promote their self-interest. The Walt Disney Company is most interested in Disney’s
self-interest and thus giving Disney a private cause of action, rather than say Viacom or the
California attorney general, is most likely to lead to the most zealous defense of Disney’s
copyrights.
54. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 37, chs. II, VII, XII.
55. Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (describing
copyright infringement as a “strict liability tort”). This general rule predates the Copyright Act of
1976. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (“Intention to infringe is
not essential under the [1909] act.”).
56. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 37, chs. II, VII, XII.
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One might naturally assume that the reason for this is that the rationale
for a strict liability standard is somehow obvious such that it is not in need
of explanation or justification. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Instead, a basic question must be addressed: why is copyright law bereft of
liability standards that are based on negligence or intentional wrongdoing?
Given that the fault standard is most pervasive in tort law generally, then
other things equal, should we not expect to see the same in the domain of
copyright infringement as well, and if not, why not? What, if anything,
about copyright justifies the exceptional treatment? The choice of a
liability standard is not an inconsequential point of law, but just the
opposite. A strict liability standard strongly favors copyright owners over
unauthorized users—or in tort terms, victims over injurers—as they may
prevail in litigation without establishing either negligence or intentional
wrongdoing by the defendant. Framing the issue in this light, it is
obviously equally true that the general rule in tort favors defendants. In
other words, there is no neutral rule; either rule favors one class of
potential litigants over the other. At least one finds a justification for the
latter rule in general tort doctrine.57 The salient question for present
purposes is the divergence in treatment across legal subject matter areas.
This divergence leads us to the discussion in Part II.B. There are different
forms of argument one might offer with regard to determining appropriate
liability standard or standards for copyright law. The previous discussion
lends support for developing a form of coherence argument for extending
fault liability to copyright.
B. The Emergence of the Modern Fault Standard in Tort
Early tort law did not tease out a fault standard, per se. The earliest
form of action was trespass, which offered a tort remedy for direct and
forcible injuries.58 In other words, the question asked was not whether the
injurer acted in a faulty manner but whether her action caused the injury
directly and forcibly. The other main so-called ancient form of action was
trespass on the case.59 Trespass on the case provided a cause of action for
injuries less direct or forcible. Although trespass on the case was one of the
early introductions of a fault requirement for recovery, in practice, courts
may have presumed injurious conduct to be wrongful.60

57. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A, cmt. b (1965) (“[S]uch exceptional cases are
limited, in general, to legislative enactments, or to relations in which the defendant has undertaken
some special responsibility for the safety of the plaintiff or his property. It is not within the scope of
this Restatement to state when such special relations may exist.”). Indeed, the rule is found in all
U.S. jurisdictions.
58. See id. § 158.
59. See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing “trespass on
the case”).
60. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law
of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (1970); see also James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L.
REV. 97, 104 (1908).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss5/4

14

Hetcher: The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Standard to Amat

2010] THE KIDS ARE ALRIGHT: APPLYING A FAULT LIABILITY STANDARD TO AMATEUR DIGITAL REMIX

1289

The negligence or fault standard replaced trespass as the dominant
standard, however.61 While the trespass rule traces its beginnings to
Medieval England, the fault standard itself is of more recent origin.62 This
origin is often put in the early to mid-19th Century. Professors Anthony J.
Sebok, Goldberg, and Zipursky trace a line of thinking from earlier cases
that lead into leading cases such as Brown v. Kendall63 and eventually
flowers with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.64
The rationales given for ushering in the fault standard have come in the
form of moral arguments. Coleman writes, “In the received view, the
substitution of fault for causation marked an abandonment of the immoral
standard of strict liability under Trespass (which, after all, imposed liability
without regard to fault) in favor of a moral foundation for tort liability
based on the fault principle.”65 The essence of the moral argument is that it
is unfair to hold the injurer liable for injuries that were not her fault. If she
is not morally responsible for them, why should she be financially
responsible?
As stated, the previous argument is deontological in form. Law and
economics scholars have also justified the move to the fault standard from
an economic or utilitarian perspective.66 Posner writes, “Perhaps, then, the
61. See Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 451 (1873) (rejecting strict liability in favor of the
negligence rule); Losee v. Buchanan 51 N.Y. 476, 488 (1873) (“No one in such case is made liable
without some fault or negligence on his part, however serious the injury may be which he may
accidentally cause; and there can be no reason for holding one liable for accidental injuries to
property when he is exempt from liability for such injuries to the person.”); see also Ind. Harbor
Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that strict
liability is only imposed when the high degree of risk associated with an activity cannot be
eliminated through due care).
62. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005) (“The old
common law had very little to say about personal injuries caused by careless behavior. A good
many basic doctrines of tort law first appeared before 1850; but it was in the late nineteenth century
that this area of law (and life) experienced its biggest spurt of growth.”).
63. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850) (“[W]hat constitutes ordinary care
will vary with the circumstances of cases. In general, it means that kind and degree of care, which
prudent and cautious men would use, such as is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is
necessary to guard against probable danger.”).
64. GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 39, at 59, 760–64, 843 (analyzing the history
of and reprinting excerpts from Kendall and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916)).
65. Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pt. 1), 1 L. & Phil.
371, 374 (1982).
66. In normative legal scholarship, an economic approach is sometimes contrasted with a
“moral” approach. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287,
292–93 (2007). On a more sophisticated approach, however, an economic approach is not viewed
as an alternative to a moral explanation but instead as an alternative moral explanation, in
particular, a consequentialist one that is grounded in either utilitarianism or some variant, such as
wealth maximization. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34
(1972); Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 908 (2001).
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dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if
followed will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient—the costjustified—level of accidents and safety.”67 Posner makes this claim not
merely in an abstract normative sense. Famously, he argues that the best
explanation of tort law doctrine is attributable to its welfare-promoting
characteristics.68 Thus, we see that both teleologists and deontologists
argue that the path of the law has been from strict liability to fault liability
for reasons that are compelling from each of the two dominant normative
perspectives: deontology and utilitarianism.
My present concern is not whether these are convincing arguments from
a top-down normative perspective. For present purposes, what matters is
that the fault standard won out in the case law. This doctrinal development
is of interest because it raises the obvious question: if a heightened moral
sensitivity toward fairness and social welfare dictated a move to the fault
standard in tort generally, then why not in copyright as well? Is it that the
same moral arguments do not apply for some reason, or is there some other
explanation?
To answer these questions, the place to begin is with the orthodox
rationales that have been provided for a strict liability rule in copyright.
Leading hornbook author Marshall Leaffer argues, “The customary
explanation for excluding innocence as a defense to copyright infringement
is that, as between the copyright owner and the infringer, the infringer is
better placed to avoid the error.”69 This justification is inadequate from the
67. Posner, supra note 66, at 33. Other economists argue that strict liability causes actors to
take too much precaution and for potential creators to take too little precaution against being
injured. In effect, strict liability turns injurers into insurers of victims’ losses and creates a moral
hazard as potential victims are not incentivized to take due care to avoid being injured. See Joseph
H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous
Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 349–61 (1996). It should be noted that there have been
defenders of the morality of strict liability. The best known example is Richard Epstein. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 40 (1985).
68. Posner, supra note 66, at 32–33.
69. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 476 (3d ed. 1999); see ABKCO
Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A]s a practical matter,
the problems of proof inherent in a rule that would permit innocent intent as a defense to copyright
infringement could substantially undermine the protections Congress intended to afford to copyright
holders.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 8–9 (1994) (“An author’s right to ward off
unauthorized copying of his work is much like a homeowner’s right to keep trespassers off his
land.”); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (rev. ed. 2010)
(“Innocent intent should no more constitute a defense in an infringement action than in the case of
conversion of tangible personalty. In each case, the injury to a property interest is worthy of redress,
regardless of the innocence of the defendant.”). This claim begs the question because Congress did
not intend a certain level of protection, per se, but instead the level of protection that serves to
promote the larger goals of copyright—promotion of the arts and sciences. The obvious problem
with this claim is that it also begs the question as to why conversion is an apt analogy in the first
place. Conversion is an intentional tort and thus to the extent that some infringements are best
characterized as accidental, the analogy fails. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1,
at n.1 (3d ed. 2005) (“This rule is dictated by the more general rule that innocence is no defense to
an action for copyright infringement.”); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L.
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perspective of modern tort law, however. To see this, consider a common
type of tort fact pattern: inadvertently hitting a pedestrian while driving an
automobile. Now, imagine two different ways in which this might happen.
In the first, the victim runs out into the street and the driver is unable to
stop in time despite the fact that she is not driving too fast for conditions
and is paying attention to the road. In the second, the driver hits the
pedestrian because the driver is not paying attention to her driving but is
instead text messaging for some casual, non-emergency reason. In both
cases, it is indeed true that the driver is in the better position to avoid the
injury for the simple reason that she could alternatively have stopped her
car in time to avoid the collision. To invoke a venerable tort doctrine, the
driver had the “last clear chance” to avert the injurious collision.70
What distinguishes these two scenarios is that in the former, the driver
is without fault, both morally and by the lights of tort law; while in the
second scenario, the driver has both committed a moral wrong and will be
found legally liable due to her negligent behavior that led to the accident. It
is clearly negligent behavior for a driver to hit a pedestrian for no better
reason than that she was distracted from the road due to text messaging.
The distinction at issue in abstract tort terms is that between faulty versus
non-faulty, accidental injuries to others.
What is surprising is that this defining distinction of tort law is simply
absent from copyright law despite the fact that copyright infringement is
agreed by all to be a tort. Once one bears this distinction in mind, the
question for Leaffer’s rationale for strict liability in copyright is the
following: why should the mere fact that the infringer is better placed to
avoid the injury be sufficient for liability?71 Shouldn’t it matter whether the
injurer was acting in a faulty manner in causing the injury? It does in
regular tort; why not in copytort? We see then that arguing from first
principles ensconced in modern tort doctrine, we are led to the conclusion
that the liability standard for copyright infringement should incorporate a
fault standard, as it is conventionally thought to be immoral to make
someone liable for injuries that occurred through no fault of her own. A
copyright-centric rationale such as Leaffer’s simply fails to address the
fault issue.
In copyright, the distinction is papered over with the notion of
“innocent infringement,” which is contrasted with “intentional
infringement.”72 In this manner, copyright doctrine is seeking to manage
REV. 139, 180 (2009) (“[N]otice does little for authors save for negating an innocent infringement
defense, which does not provide a full defense to infringement but rather serves only to mitigate
statutory damages.”).
70. “Last clear chance” refers to the doctrine that a plaintiff who committed contributory acts
of negligence may nonetheless recover damages against a defendant who had the last opportunity in
time to avoid the damage. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479–80 (1965).
71. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 69, at 476.
72. Compare Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding former Beatle George Harrison to be an innocent infringer when he
unintentionally and unconsciously copied the tune of another song), and N. Music Corp. v.
Pacemaker Music Co., No. 64 Civ. 1956, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
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with two piles in which to lump injuries for which redress may be owed,
instead of three. It would be as if tort law attempted to manage with only
intentional torts and unintentional, that is, innocent torts. This will not do
in modern tort law, which, once the intentional injuries are set aside, insists
upon asking of the unintentional ones, that is, the accidental ones, whether
the accident was the result of faulty or negligent behavior on the part of the
injurer. What is missing in copyright law is a notion of accidental
infringement, per se—an infringement that is not intentional yet which
must still be evaluated for fault.
C. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
It is at this juncture in the overall argument that remix, and in particular
amateur remix, merits reentry into the discussion. I will argue below that it
is in the context of amateur remix that it is most fitting to characterize
infringements as accidental. Before progressing to this discussion,
however, there is yet more groundwork to be laid. The findings of the
above discussion are so startling as to demand a second look before
moving on. The best means of doing this is by raising the following
possibilities. Within traditional tort law, exceptions to the fault rule have
long been recognized. Thus, we must look at these in order to determine
whether a parallel rationale might be at work for copyright infringement.
The paradigmatic types of fact pattern in tort that have merited exceptional
treatment are injuries caused by dangerous activities such as using or
keeping explosives or wild animals, on the one hand, and trespass to land,
on the other hand.73 The First Restatement of Torts utilized the category of
“ultrahazardous” activities while the Second Restatement of Torts refers to
“abnormally dangerous” activities.74 Looking at the law regarding these
sorts of activities will give us a better understanding as to whether
copyright infringement may be plausibly understood to fall within the
ambit of the strict liability exception as it is found in tort law.
Under the First Restatement, if one injured another while engaging in
an ultrahazardous activity, one’s actions would be held to a strict liability
standard.75 Under the Second Restatement, as noted above, the wording
1965) (“[I]f copying did in fact occur; it cannot be defended on the ground that it was done
unconsciously and without intent to appropriate plaintiff’s work.”), with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (reversing summary judgment and
remanding for further proceedings on whether defendants were liable for intentionally inducing
infringement).
73. Compare Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931)
(applying strict liability where explosives were held in quantity in a dangerous place), and Mills v.
Smith, 673 P.2d 117, 120 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming strict liability on defendant owners for
injuries suffered by a minor inflicted by a lion), with United States v. Osterlund, 671 F.2d 1267,
1267–68 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying trespass liability where defendant’s residence encroached on
land owned by plaintiff).
74. Compare 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938), with 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
75. 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938) (“An activity is ultrahazarous if it (a)
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be
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was changed to the test for “abnormally dangerous” activities.76 That
Restatement calls for courts to apply a multi-factor test, which includes the
following factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm
that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the
risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the
activity is not a matter of common usage; (e)
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.77
Courts and commentators have generally agreed that there is no magic
number of these elements that must be satisfied.78
Consider how these factors would apply to amateur digital content. The
first factor requires a “high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others.” This factor contains two operative parts: first, the
high degree of risk of some harm; second, the person, land, or chattels of
others. The first part will often be satisfied in infringement cases as the
factor merely calls for some harm, as the focus is on the degree of risk, not
the degree of severity of the harm. Amateurs as unauthorized users of
copyrighted content may indeed sometimes cause harm. For instance, a
pornographic remix of a Harry Potter movie may taint the characters if the
remix is disseminated to the public and widely viewed. As to whether there
is a “high degree of risk,” while this phrase is left undefined, it certainly
seems possible in some instances. Using the same example, there would
appear to be a high degree of risk of at least some harm from a
pornographic remix of a Harry Potter movie. The key point, however, is
that this would be judged on a case-by-case basis, and it appears that the
vast run of amateur remix would cause no harm. A different story might
pertain to commercial remix, but it is Lessig’s goal to assimilate the
arguments for commercial and amateur remix—not mine.79
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage.”).
76. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
77. Id.
78. See Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1991), amended by 817 P.2d
1359 (Wash. 1991); see also 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977) (“In
determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed in Clauses (a) to (f) of this Section
are all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of
itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the
other hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.”).
79. Lessig downplays the distinction between commercial and non-commercial uses. LESSIG,
supra note 5, at 55. Lessig compares jazz musicians of old and their tolerated practice of
improvising on works of others and asks rhetorically why the same should hold for the
contemporary parallel, music mash-ups: “Why should it be effectively impossible for an artist from
Harlem practicing the form of art of the age to commercialize his creativity because the costs of
negotiating and clearing the rights here are so incredibly high?” Id. at 105. His response, “The
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A good bit of evidence as to how the U.S. Copyright Office views harm
can be seen in its Report on Orphan Works and legislative proposal.80
While this document has not passed into law, it is highly significant
because the document acknowledges that it would often be the case that
there would be no damages, even were the owner of the orphan work to
surface.81 Given that everyday Internet users are capable of grabbing
content from a seemingly unlimited variety of sources of online content,
there is likely to be a good deal of usage of orphan works in amateur
remix. Sometimes the ownership of this work will be evident, as is
especially true for mainstream commercial culture such as film, music, and
books. But often as well, content will be found from sources that provide
no ownership information. Thus, these sorts of remix will be comprised of
de facto orphan works, and judging from what the U.S. Copyright Office
has stated, “reasonable damages” will often be little or nothing.82 In the
Report, the U.S. Copyright Office goes so far as to provide a special note
concerning non-commercial works.83
The second factor is the “likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great.” The Restatement does not define “great,” but the sorts of
harms the Restatement considers as paradigmatic examples include being
injured by dynamite.84 As just noted, typically there will be no harm. So,
moreover, there will typically not be great harm. But unlike Lessig, I
acknowledge that great harm is possible, say, if a slightly altered copy of a
newly released movie were made available online.
The third factor considers the “inability to eliminate the risk by the
exercise of reasonable care.” One response to this factor is that it shows the
inapplicability of the whole framework to copyright infringement, which,
one might argue, is by its nature akin to an intentional tort, such that it
makes no sense to talk about eliminating risk. One might argue, for
example, that when the DJ who goes by the name Girl Talk copies a song
in order to use it in a mash-up, it makes no sense to ask whether he could
have eliminated the risk through reasonable care. The unauthorized copy
was not the accidental by-product of some other action like accidentally
hitting a pedestrian while driving. Rather, it was his intention to make the
unauthorized copy.

answer is: for no good reason, save inertia and the forces that like the world frozen as it is.” Id. In
other words, these remix artists should be able to “commercialize” their “creativity.” Id. The
following remark is further evidence that Lessig seeks to legalize commercial remix as well: “There
should be a broad swath of freedom for professionals to remix existing copyrighted work . . . .” Id.
at 255.
80. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS (2006).
81. Id. at 86–87, 115–19.
82. See id. at 49–50.
83. Id. at 82.
84. See Catholic Welfare Guild, Inc. v. Brodney Corp., 208 A.2d 301, 301, 303–04 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1964) (applying strict liability to defendant where plaintiff’s property was damaged from
defendant’s explosive blasting across the street).
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Based on the above discussion, there is a plausible rejoinder to this
argument, which is that it is often most accurate to see unauthorized
copying of a third party’s work as accidental in nature.85 For instance, this
would seem like the most felicitous manner to view instances of so-called
“innocent infringement.”86 The preeminent case involving innocent
infringement is ABKCO Music, Ltd. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.87 The court
was clear that it did not think the defendant intended to make an infringing
copy. The court noted that this was an instance of “subconscious
copying.”88 Commentators have focused on the element of defendant’s
knowledge when discussing this case.89 Note, however, that it is
meaningful to ask whether there was an inability to eliminate the risk by
the exercise of reasonable care. Indeed, it would appear the defendant
might well have avoided the risk. It is not that the unconscious copying
was of an obscure song. Rather, it was a hit song by well-known artists
who would have been recognized by many people with exposure to the
work, particularly so, one would think, for people in the music business.
The duty that negligence law sets is for actors to take due care to avoid
causing harm to others. Thus, one might copy without authorization and
yet take reasonable care to avoid the risk of harm. This is arguably an apt
description of the norm in the fan fiction community, which has been an
early and venerable source of amateur-generated content.90 The norm
proscribes commercialization of fan works.91 One reason to do so is to
avoid the potential to cause market harm to the owner’s work. In
negligence terms, this can be characterized as an attempt to exercise due
care to avoid harm through infringement.92
85. Tort law distinguishes between accidental and intentionally harmful activities. For
instance, in Cole v. Hibberd, No. CA94-01-015, 1994 WL 424103, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 12 Dist.
Aug. 15, 1994), the court noted that the plaintiff could not choose which cause of action it
preferred, that there was a fact of the matter as to whether the injury was caused intentionally or
accidentally. Behavior online and in virtual worlds, for example, is bringing about more accidental
infringements. Amateur machinima is a good example of an emerging behavior, much of which is
plausibly fair use, with the implication that, that which is not may be accidental infringement. Alex
Pham, Straight from Video, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/11/b
usiness/fi-machinima11 (describing the machinima technique of creating movies using the digital
characters from video games as controlled by their gamers turned directors).
86. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998–99 & n.12 (2d
Cir. 1983).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 997 (affirming the trial court’s conclusion “that the substantial similarity coupled
with access constituted copyright infringement, even though subconsciously accomplished”).
89. Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
123, 133 (2002).
90. JENKINS, supra note 1 at 162–77.
91. See Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How
Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729, 752 (2008) (noting two situations in fandom where attribution is considered
important).
92. Note that it does not matter if defendant consciously sought to exercise due care—as was
famously argued by Holmes long ago, negligence is an objective standard. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE
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There may, however, be situations in which there is an inability to
eliminate the risk of harm. For example, in the case of Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, it was arguably substantially certain
that by publishing the work from former President Gerald Ford’s book in
its magazine that The Nation would injure Ford in light of the specific
agreement between Ford and Time that Time would not publish the work if
it appeared elsewhere first.93 While the editor of The Nation would not
have been privy to this agreement, as a magazine editor, it is likely fair to
say that he was “substantially certain” that this particular sort of harm
would result.94
Contrasting the above two sorts of fact patterns demonstrates why the
dichotomy of intentional infringement versus innocent infringement
offered in copyright doctrine is not sufficiently fine-grained. The category
of intentionally wrongful activity adequately captures the defendant’s
actions in Harper & Row, but clearly, it is inadequate to characterize the
copying that occurred in Harrisongs as simply innocent. It is innocent if by
this we mean simply that there was not a substantial certainty of injury and
thus no intentional tort. But if the term “innocent” is used this broadly,
then the driver who accidentally runs down the pedestrian while text
messaging is innocent as well, inasmuch as her injurious act was not
intentional.
The fourth factor considers the “extent to which the activity is not a
matter of common usage.” How this factor applies would depend on the
details of the unauthorized copying. In Harper & Row, for example, the
editor of The Nation had the explicit goal of “scooping” Time magazine on
the juiciest bits of Ford’s autobiography, namely, those facts surrounding
Ford’s presidential pardon of Richard Nixon.95 This is a very different type
of activity from, say, the sorts of activities lauded by Professor Henry
Jenkins of teenagers writing fan fiction based on well-known characters.96
This sort of activity is very common while the behavior engaged in by The
Nation is not. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that these sorts of
COMMON LAW 112–13 (1881).
93. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985) (“Time’s
cancellation of its projected serialization and its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of
the infringement. . . . Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of
actual damage.”). The Second Circuit certainly treated the harm as direct and imminent. Id. at 545.
94. As discussed below, there are two means to satisfy the intentionality requirement for an
intentional tort. One can explicitly intend some outcome, such as that one’s hand comes into
forcible contact with another’s nose, or second, one can intend some other outcome, but yet the
injurious, tortious outcome is “substantially certain” to result. 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 825 (1979).
95. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–43. To get a sense of the powerful thrust of amateurgenerated content, one need only go online and search about for the quickly growing body of
amateur works that draw from the Twilight book and film series. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 13
(analyzing four case studies relating to the Twilight franchise).
96. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 131 (“Fans are the most active segment of the media audience,
one that refuses to simply accept what they are given, but rather insists on the right to become full
participants.”).
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amateur creative activities will continue to become more common as a
function of technical advances. Thus, technological advance creates a
secular trend against such activities being subject to a strict liability
standard by the lights of general tort doctrine, inasmuch as it creates a
secular trend toward their production, such that they increasingly become a
matter of “common usage.”97
In light of this factor, consider a venerable explanation for strict liability
doctrine developed by Professor George Fletcher in his famous article,
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory.98 He first notes that the notion of
ultrahazardous or unreasonably dangerous activities cannot be the core
explanation of strict liability as tort law applies a fault rule for injuries that
result from driving automobiles despite the fact that this is clearly a
dangerous activity.99 Fletcher’s explanation for when tort law applies a
strict liability rule relies on the purported non-reciprocal nature of the risks
created in certain types of activities, such as blasting. The more common
an activity becomes, the more likely it is that a larger degree of reciprocity
of risk comes about in which the same social groups both create risks for
others due to their engaging in the activity and are themselves subjected to
the same sort of risks due to engaging in the activity.100 In this light, we
can view the so-called “democratization” of content creation, which is
commonly viewed as a hallmark of Web 2.0. Because the creation of
amateur digital content is an increasingly pervasive activity, on the basis of
Fletcher’s reciprocity argument, one would predict that the risks produced
by creators would become increasingly reciprocal, and thus, there would be
ever less reason to apply a strict liability standard.
The fifth factor considers the “inappropriateness of the activity to the
place where it is carried on.” Once again, this factor would appear to vary
depending on the type of unauthorized copying. Consider a website such as
the one run by Heather Lawver, a teenager who maintained a website for
children to post fan fiction about Harry Potter.101 A particular posting to
this site surely could not be characterized as inappropriate to the place
where it was carried on given that the very purpose of the site was to serve
as a venue for such works. Indeed, this factor highlights one of the aspects
that makes cyberspace so pregnant with possibility—that new places can
be created for new forms of activity such that, almost as a matter of
definition, the sort of activity at issue is appropriate to the place.102
97. As noted earlier, it is increasingly common to make references such as
“creator/consumer.” See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
98. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
99. Id. at 543–44.
100. Id.
101. Heather L. Lawver, The Daily Prophet Needs Your Help!, http://www.dprophet.com
(last visited Oct. 1, 2010).
102. But see CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT
ORGANIZATIONS 196–202 (2008) (discussing the website meetup.com, which allows users to set up
affinity groups of their own choosing). While the meetup.com website was okay with groups for
witches and stay-at-home moms, another website made the decision to censor a group for anorexia.
Id. at 197, 200, 203–05.
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Finally, the sixth factor looks to the “extent to which its value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.” For example, as
already noted, Jenkins and others have argued persuasively that amateur
remix may have great positive social value.103 Professor Rebecca Tushnet
argues that it has social value due to the fact that its non-commercial nature
means that types of works that would otherwise not be created are
created.104 The importance of Tushnet’s point is that it implicitly resists at
least one reading of the Bleistein non-discrimination principle, which can
be read to say that the copyrightability of a work should not discriminate
against some forms of content as compared to others. Tushnet is doing
precisely this and, in the present writer’s opinion, properly so. Her claim,
in effect, is not just that more creative content will be produced but that
content of a new and different sort will be produced.105 Surely, it is a better
reading of the constitutional dictate to promote the arts and sciences that
this builds in some notion of diversity and quality of content as well as
simply a quantitative notion of incentivizing more content creation.
On the other hand, once we open the Pandora’s box of judging the
quality or social value of content, we must be open to the prospect of
socially harmful content as well. For instance, Professor Ann Bartow has
plausibly argued that amateur-generated pornography has a negative social
value and should be recognized as such.106
What are we to conclude, then, from this application of the Second
Restatement’s § 520 multi-factor test for copyright infringement? As
illustrated, there is not one typical sort of situation. In general, however,
amateur-generated content does not fit the overall profile for strict liability
torts based on the § 520 test. We cannot allow the intricacies of the multifactor test to be the trees through which we lose the forest of the basic
sense of the test, which is to apply the strict liability standard to the sorts of
activities that are inherently dangerous in the sense that there is a real risk
of significant harm and that this risk cannot be dampened through
precaution.107 As I will argue in the next Part, it is typically not the case
103. JENKINS, supra note 1, at 278–80.
104. See Tushnet, supra note 6, 521 n.20. There is a line of thought in copyright policy that
courts should not engage in the qualitative analysis of particular works. This is generally described
as the Bleistein Doctrine. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52
(1903); see also Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works Under Copyright
Law During the 19th and 20th Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 131 n.75
(2006). The application of factor (f)—the sixth factor—begs the question as to whether the Bleistein
Doctrine is tenable, at least in this context.
105. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 526–36.
106. Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 799, 812–16 (2008).
107. See Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Cal. 1948) (holding that the question of
whether a case is a proper one for imposing strict liability is one of law for the court to decide and
applying the strict liability standard to an activity it deemed ultrahazardous); see also 3
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977) (“The essential question is whether the risk
created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding
it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is
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that there is a real risk of significant harm that cannot be reduced through
the exercise of due care and so a vast amount of amateur digital content
would be excluded from consideration for a strict liability rule on these
grounds. Regarding the issue of whether the risk can be dampened through
greater precaution, whether this factor is even applicable will depend on
the manner in which the amateur digital content was created. As noted
above, this factor is inapplicable when the unauthorized copying is
intentional, but not all unauthorized copying is most aptly characterized as
intentional. While the question of due care is, in general, alien to copyright
discourse, for the reasons discussed above, this lacunae is unwarranted and
in need of amendment in an approach to copyright that takes tort—
particularly accidental infringement—seriously, especially in a world of
exploding amateur digital content in which authors increasingly create risk
of harm to others but there is not an intention to harm.
D. Copytrespass
As mentioned above, the second venerable type of behavior that
receives a strict liability standard in traditional tort is trespass to land.108 In
copyright cases and commentary, the analogy is sometimes drawn between
trespass to land and copyright infringement. However, what are we to
make of this comparison? Typically, when this comparison is brought up,
it is in what I would characterize as a conclusory legal fashion, i.e., the
comparison is drawn because both sorts of behavior have a strict liability
standard attached to them. This fact, qua positive legal fact, is
uncontroversial. The harder question is whether these sorts of activities are
similar in some intrinsic way that would explain the fact that they each
share the exceptional liability standard. Strict liability for land trespass
would not justify strict liability in copyright given that one might as well
point to the fact of fault liability for trespass to chattel as a justification of
fault liability in copyright.109 In other words, even assuming that trespass is
an apt analogy, why think trespass to land is more apt than trespass to
chattel?
The obvious first question to ask is what is the justification for the strict
liability rule in real property law? The rule has been justified as in keeping
carried on with all reasonable care. In other words, are its dangers and inappropriateness for the
locality so great that, despite any usefulness it may have for the community, it should be required as
a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence.”).
108. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (discussing the elements of
trespass); see also id. § 166 (“Except where the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous
activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another, or causing a
thing or third person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even
though the entry causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person in whose security the
possessor has a legally protected interest.”); 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1934)
(discussing the distinction between “injury” and “harm,” shedding light on the types of harm
envisioned by tort law to be recompensable).
109. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 472–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see
also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Horn Tower Constr. Co., 363 P.2d 175, 178 (Colo. 1961)
(“[F]ault of the actor is an essential ingredient of liability [for trespass to chattels].”).
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with a special solicitude for the home in the common law in keeping with
other doctrines such as the special solicitude as seen in the Fourth
Amendment.110 The rule does have long roots in the common law. Indeed,
as noted above, the ancient cause of action in tort generally was trespass, in
which the liability was strict (so long as the injurious action was direct and
forcible). In this sense, the strict liability rule for real property trespassers
can be viewed as a remnant of a past in which this was the general rule.
Courts sometimes provoke the venerable notion that a person’s home is her
castle.111 The norm intended to be captured in this phrase is that the home
deserves special protection. Strict liability provides such protection as it
favors owners over trespassers.
Other courts have cast land trespass as a sort of dignitary harm. A
leading case is Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which defendant
moved a mobile home across the plaintiff’s property.112 Likely due to the
fact that it was winter in Wisconsin and snow covered the ground, the jury
found no compensatory harm to the plaintiff’s property. The court
nevertheless found harm, noting that,
The action for intentional trespass is directed at
vindication of the legal right. . . . The law recognizes actual
harm in every trespass to land whether or not compensatory
damages are awarded. Thus, in the case of intentional trespass
to land, the nominal damage award represents the recognition
that, although immeasurable in mere dollars, actual harm has
occurred.
....
. . . Society has an interest in punishing and deterring
intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests
of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in
preserving the integrity of the legal system. Private
landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who
trespass upon their land will be appropriately punished.113
The court’s opinion can be read as discerning what is, in effect,
dignitary harm. The notion of dignitary harm is a promising parallel to
copyright, inasmuch as a harm to intangible property is also not a physical
harm, for the obvious reason that one cannot do physical harm to that
which has no physical existence. There is a problem with drawing this
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
111. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 53 So. 2d 340, 346 (Ala. 1951); see also State v. Thomas, 673
N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Ohio 1997) (“However, there is no duty to retreat when one is assaulted in
one’s own home. . . . This exception to the duty to retreat derives from the doctrine that one’s home
is one’s castle and one has a right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack.”).
112. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997).
113. Id. at 160.
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parallel, however. At least in the United States, copyright is widely viewed
as grounded in economic reasoning, which by its nature denies granting sui
generis normative status to non-instrumentalist notions such as dignity.
Dignitary harm on an economic conception is dignitary harm in scare
quotes. On an economic cum consequentialist approach, the legal
recognition of such harms begins and ends with their analysis as
constructed and justified solely in terms of their instrumental role in the
promotion of utility, welfare, or wealth. Dignity has no independent
normative weight in an economic or utilitarian model.
A variety of non-instrumentalist normative approaches may recognize
dignitary harms as real and worthy of independent normative recognition
and protection. In terms of an actual legal regime that might recognize such
harms as deontological primitives, the obvious suggestion is a moral rights
approach to copyright. Indeed, in an ordinary language sense of the word
“dignity,” it seems transparent that moral rights are dignitary rights. This
notwithstanding, from the perspective of the U.S. copyright system, there
are no dignitary rights, per se.114 This has the important implication that if
copyright is to justify a strict liability rule by analogy to trespass to land
and its correlative dignitary harms, the justification must be in instrumental
terms. In other words, one must provide a plausible account of how it
optimizes the instrumental goals of copyright to have strict liability and
conceive of the harm as dignitary harm.115
114. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for
their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of
authors.”). But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291 (1970) (“The [copyright] system
provides a fairly useful way to protect an author’s dignitary rights . . . .”). Many nations recognize
moral rights as they are signatories to the Berne Convention. Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2(1), Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T.
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.law.cornell.ed
u/treaties/berne/overview.html. Article Six protects attribution and integrity, stating:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or
reputation.
Id.
However, moral rights regimes have had more success in other nations as the United States has
really only embraced them with respect to visual art. See generally Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, § 3(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)); Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, § 603(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006)) (providing special attribution integrity rights only
to creators of visual art). “Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by
subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright owner.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b)
(2006). But see Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26 (enjoining ABC television network from editing the Monty
Python television program).
115. It is a staple of utilitarian theory, after all, that just because one is a utilitarian (or other
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At the level of ordinary language, it is worth asking whether copyright
infringement seems intuitively connected with dignitary harm. As a point
of reference, note that when moral rights violations are discussed, the
factual contexts are typically ones in which the infringing acts are quite
intentional,116 and second, that when it comes to the world of amateur
digital content, it is inapt in many situations to conceive of the infringing
acts as an intentional affront to dignity. Importantly, there is a connection
between being intentional and being an affront to dignity, by the lights of
established deontological approaches.117 It is obvious to ordinary morality
generally to view an intentional harm to another as morally worse than an
accidental harm, all else equal. The obvious implication for copyright,
then, is that whether a particular act of infringement is an affront to dignity
or not will vary depending on the degree of intentionality in the infringing
act.
As noted earlier, formal copyright doctrine does recognize the notion of
“intentional infringement,” although the factor goes to the question of
remedy, not liability itself. The question is raised, then, in what sense are
non-intentional infringements properly seen as affronts to dignity? Indeed,
even in the case of many amateur digital creations that may be said to
involve intentional infringement, it is contrary to ordinary moral intuition,
and seemingly purely formalistic, to conceive of the acts as affronts to
dignity. Perhaps the best examples again are those of the sort lauded by
Jenkins: Heather Lawver’s use of Harry Potter, for instance, is driven by
love and admiration of the works of its creator J.K. Rowling; surely, there
is no violation of the author’s dignity in any ordinary language sense of
that term.118 Thus, this consideration offers no support for drawing a

consequentialist) one can still engage in talk of seemingly non-utilitarian, normative concepts so
long as one does not forget the so-called “rule utilitarian” justification for doing so. After all, the
fount of modern utilitarianism—John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty—does precisely this for the
deontological primitive of liberty.
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2006). The rights of certain authors to attribution and
integrity are subject to § 113(d) limitations. Visual artists have the right
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that
right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right
Id.; see also Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir.
2010) (finding in favor of an artist who successfully stipulated claim for violation of his moral right
of integrity when museum displayed his unfinished work).
117. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[C][1]
(rev. ed. 2010) (noting that “an intentional and prejudicial mutilation is an integrity violation,
remediable through not only an injunction, but damages as well”).
118. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 171–74. Heather Lawver has created a medium where readers of
Harry Potter can immerse themselves in the material “to escape from or reaffirm aspects of their
real lives.” Id. at 174.
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parallel with trespass to land even supposing that trespass to land is most
accurately viewed as a strict liability rule based on dignitary harm.
In the above discussion, we first saw that in general there has been a
historical shift from strict liability to fault liability and that there is no
prima facie reason that this should not apply to copyright infringement as
well. Next, we looked at the exceptions to the general fault rule in tort—
ultrahazardous activities and land trespass. We saw that the rationale for
those exceptions does not apply to copyright infringement.
As a final consideration, it is worth asking whether there is some sui
generis reason for strict liability in copyright. Consider the general law and
economic justification for strict liability: When one activity is so
undesirable that society wants to create the strongest rule to deter it so that
the injurer is less likely to engage in the activity, given that the injurer has
become the insurer of all injuries, then strict liability may be justified.119
For most instances of amateur digital content, however, this description
is the opposite of the truth for reasons discussed above. Amateur digital
content is especially attractive as the activities that may result in injuries
are not dangerous but instead are often highly educational and culturally
enriching.120 This fact is a strong argument against a strict liability
standard.
The preceding discussion is best evaluated in light of Lessig’s argument
for legalization of remix. The reason is that the preceding argument for a
fault standard proceeded by comparison to the status quo. This leaves open
the question as to whether this solution, even if preferable to the status quo,
is nevertheless not preferable to a third alternative, which may be
preferable to both the status quo and to the fault standard alternative. The
obvious one to consider in this regard is the alternative offered by Lessig as
initially set out in Part I. I will argue, however, that Lessig’s solution is
fundamentally flawed due to its failure to appreciate the potentially
dispositive role played by the fair use doctrine in the new world of amateur
remix. The next Part will examine fair use as applied to remix, a topic
conspicuously absent from Lessig’s book-length treatment of remix but is
crucial to understanding the most appropriate means to regulate amateurgenerated content.
III. THE FAIR USE OF AMATEUR REMIX
As I noted in the Introduction, the fair use analysis of remix will be
crucial to unraveling the ultimate import of both Parts I and II and their
interconnectivity as well. First, consider Part I: Lessig’s argument to
legalize remix in order to avoid the current deplorable situation in which
youthful remixers are criminals. The following fair use analysis of remix
will have a direct, dispositive impact on this argument.
119. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192–97 (5th ed. 1998). See also Susan
L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence”
in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995) (discussing that strict liability has been
supported in criminal law to deter socially undesirable risk-taking for the sake of social welfare).
120. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 80, at 49–50; Jenkins, supra note 1, at 278–80;
text accompanying notes 82, 103.
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At the same time, the fair use analysis of remix is of significant
consequence for the issue raised in Part II, namely, whether copyright
doctrine should adopt a more normatively-nuanced approach to the setting
of the liability standard in copyright infringement cases, leaving room for
application of a fault standard when appropriate. As already noted above in
passing, the connection is that if it is the case, as I argue, that much
amateur digital remix is fair use, then the injury-related facts that undergird
these situations will be ones in which an unauthorized amateur use of
copyprotected material is far from “substantially certain” to produce a
situation in which the owner’s rights are violated by her unauthorized use.
In such circumstances, the user risks harm but otherwise engages in a
socially worthwhile activity. Modern negligence law emerged to deal with
this sort of situation generally, and there appears to be no reason the same
logic should not apply to torts that occur in fact patterns in copyright
contexts as well.
Before engaging in the specific fair use analysis of amateur remix, there
are a few points worth making about fair use in general. First, fair use is
expanding. It is common to claim the opposite, but this is done for what
appear to be polemical purposes—perhaps admirable ones but polemical
ones nevertheless.121 However, cases such as the search engine case Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp. represent dramatic expansions in fair use of search
engines, which are repeatedly used to access millions of copyright
protected copies without owner authorization, and yet, the activity is
deemed a fair use.122 This dramatic expansion in the scale of activity that
may be deemed fair is apparently due to courts’ sensible adoption of the
fair use factors to a changing environment in which such large-scale
unauthorized uses do not harm the owners’ reasonable markets for their
works; while at the same time, they provide an extraordinary benefit to
society via the transformational and informational tool that is the search
engine.
This example is instructive both for showing how copyright is capable
of expanding dramatically and for showing how technological advances are
serving as the impetus for a reconfiguration and expansion of fair use. In
the case of remix, the relevant technological change is the emergence of
the set of technologies from cameras and video on phones, to easy
uploading capability to sites such as YouTube or Flickr, to easy editing
software. Mix all of this up and we are seeing as a result a true cultural
explosion.
It has become pro forma to add that most such work is dross.123 I will
refrain. Suppose it is. Should one have expected some other result? Isn’t
121. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 579–80 (1998) (discussing the predictions
that fair use of digital media will be reduced in the near future).
122. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2003).
123. Even Lessig cannot resist; he writes,
[T]he breadth of this market . . . can’t help but inspire a wider range of creators.
For reasons at the core of this book, inspiring more creativity is more important
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this simply an instance of the law of the bell-shaped curve? Most of
everything is mediocre by definition, right? If most professionally created
and produced content such as movies, books, TV, etc. are mediocre, should
we really expect more of amateurs? Nevertheless, a true cultural explosion
is not to be dismissed lightly, and as I will argue below, fair use doctrine
does not make this mistake. In fact, it is prepared to do just the opposite—
namely, to embrace and provide succor for much amateur-generated
content.
Indeed, I will argue that the unique history of fair use provides
additional reason to suppose that courts will be especially comfortable in
taking the initiative in facilitating the explicit expansion of fair use to
cover amateur remix. As courts often note, the fair use doctrine developed
in the case law and while the doctrine was codified into the 1976 Copyright
Act,124 Congress was explicit that its goal was precisely not to freeze the
doctrine but instead to encourage courts to allow it to change in order to
adapt to changing circumstances.125 The explosion in amateur-generated
content is plausibly viewed as just such a circumstance.
Ironically, despite Congress’s explicit invitation to judicial flexibility
and innovation, courts without exception apply the four-factor test as set
out in the Copyright Act, although the test was itself a distillation of the
vast run of case law involving fair use going all the way back to Folsom v.
Marsh.126 Happily, as will now be seen, these four factors do not serve as
the four corners of a box to contain the expansion of fair use when it is
appropriate that it should do so. Thus, it is a virtual certainty—no pun
intended—that courts encountering fair use defenses in infringement cases
involving amateur remix will engage in the following sort of four-factor
analysis.
A. Factor One: Purpose and Character of the Use
Factor One of the fair use test looks to the purpose and character of the
use.127 The two sub-factors to Factor One look to whether the use is
commercial and whether the use is for nonprofit educational purposes.128

than whether you or I like the creativity we’ve inspired.
....
. . . I mean to romanticize the yeoman creator. In each case, the skeptic could
argue that the product is better produced elsewhere . . . . The Long Tail enables a
wider range of people to speak. Whatever they say, that’s a very good thing.
Speaking teaches the speaker even if it just makes noise.
LESSIG, supra note 5, at 130, 132.
124. Copyright Act of 1976, § 107, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006)).
125. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–78 (1994).
126. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
127. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
128. See id.
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The variety and creativity of remix culture is truly astounding.129 Tushnet
notes, “[F]anworks have expanded from mostly text-based, with occasional
graphic art, to include music and video. These works add new characters,
stories, or twists to the existing versions.”130
As noted earlier, much amateur creative work is thought to be of low
quality.131 There can be low-quality transformations as well as high-quality
ones, however. The Bleistein non-discrimination principle counsels against
paying attention to the perceived quality of a work.132 Accordingly, quality
judgments are often thought to have no place in the transformative
analysis, as was indicated by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.133 In finding the work to be a parody, the Campbell court
refused to take the further step of evaluating the quality of the parody
(explicitly at least, seemingly in order to establish the point of doctrine—as
the court went out of its way to make a somewhat snarky remark on the
point in passing)134 and indeed can be seen to damn the work by faint
praise.135
Campbell proffers two distinct conceptions of transformativeness. The
first test looks to whether a new work sufficiently alters the first, and the
second looks to whether the new work promotes social welfare.136 In the
case of remix, works will often possess each of these features. Whether a
fanwork is sufficiently creative will, of course, turn on the standard a work
must pass to be a new work. If the test is merely the test for new works as
applied in the context of originality, the test will be easy to pass.137
In the context of defining a new work for the purposes of originality,
129. Jenkins breaks down fan-based remix into ten categories, including: (1)
Recontextualization, (2) Expanding the Series Timeline, (3) Refocalization, (4) Moral Realignment,
(5) Genre Shifting, (6) Cross Overs, (7) Character Dislocation, (8) Personalization, (9) Emotional
Intensification, and (10) Eroticization. JENKINS, supra note 1, at 162–77.
130. Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 497, 503 (2008).
131. See, e.g., ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: HOW TODAY’S INTERNET IS KILLING
OUR CULTURE 56 (2007) (“Do we really need to wade through the tidal wave of amateurish work of
authors who have never been professionally selected for publication?”).
132. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (discussing the
equal copyright protection for humble advertisements as for works of high art, regardless of their
quality).
133. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (“The threshold question
when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be
perceived. Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not
matter to fair use.”).
134. Id. at 582–83.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 579.
137. Judge Posner in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange has argued that the standard for derivative
works is a higher one. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304–05 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The
requirement of originality is significant chiefly in connection with derivative works, where if
interpreted too liberally it would paradoxically inhibit rather than promote the creation of such
works by giving the first creator a considerable power to interfere with the creation of subsequent
derivative works from the same underlying work.”).
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the test is binary; either the work is sufficiently original or it is not. By
contrast, the fair use test is not binary. A work that possesses a bare
minimum of originality so as to just pass the test to avoid being labeled a
derivative work would be unlikely to count as transformative in the context
of Factor One analysis as courts are interested in the degree of
transformation. The more transformative the work, the more weight that
will be given to the consideration of transformative use vis-à-vis the other
factors of the fair use test.138
On Campbell’s second conception of transformative use, courts are
instructed to perform a rough welfare calculation in order to measure
transformative use by considering the social value of the use. I would
contend that most remix works would easily pass this test as they both
create social welfare and do not create offsetting harms. As noted in the
introductory comments to this Part, in the search engine cases, for
example, courts have found the role that the works in question play in the
functioning of search engines to be a transformative use that is extremely
socially valuable.139
When one thinks of the welfare created by new works, it is natural to
think in terms of the welfare that would come through consumption of the
works. By this standard, it would appear that a low quality work would
have a marginal impact on social welfare. And given that much remix is
thought to be of low quality, the conclusion would seem to be that much
remix adds little to social welfare. But the issue is more complicated as the
utility impact may pertain not only to the work itself but to the impact on
the people involved. Following Professor Tony Reese, Tushnet, for
example, points to the transformation involved in remix as pertaining to
the creator and not the work per se.140 Lessig argues that participating in
remix culture promotes personal integrity.141 To the extent that this is true,
there is no reason a court could not factor this into Reese’s conception of
works that transform their creators. Lessig also argues that mere diversity
of remix will better inspire creators.142 Tushnet argues that the fact that fan
works are motivated for non-commercial reasons and that creators write for
niche audiences means that a broader array of content will emerge than in a
138. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333–37
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a Star Trek commentary book contained enough original expression
to be considered a derivative work, but not enough to be transformative for the purposes of the fair
use test). See infra notes 116–18 for a discussion on derivative works.
139. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2003).
140. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 504 (“Transformation can also occur when someone remakes
a work to make it more meaningful to herself and uses it as a lens to interpret the world . . . .”); see
also R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
467, 494 (2008) (“[A]ppellate courts also clearly do not view the preparation of a derivative work—
or any transformation or alteration of a work’s content—as necessary to a finding that a defendant’s
use is transformative. Instead, courts focus on whether the purpose of the defendant’s use is
transformative.”).
141. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 92 (“And with a practice of writing [blogs] comes a certain
important integrity.”).
142. Id. at 42.
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context in which creators are motivated by monetary rewards.143 There is
no reason courts cannot pay attention to these diversity benefits in their
determinations regarding the existence of transformative use.
Note, however, that when one applies a welfarist approach, one must be
open to uses that may be socially deleterious as well. An important albeit
controversial example is pornography. J.K. Rowling and George Lucas, the
owners of the Harry Potter and the Star Wars characters, respectively,
have each noted that they are opposed to pornographic uses of their works
by fans.144 In the rapidly evolving world of digital remixing technology,
these authors could expect to see remixed pornographic content drawing
from feature-length Harry Potter and Star Wars films. Thus, while it is fair
to conclude that much fan fiction and remix is transformative—both
because these works contain new forms of expression, meaning, and
message and because they are generally productive of social welfare— the
logic of a welfarist approach to transformative use forces the conclusion
that some works may be transformative yet arguably productive of
disutility.
Next, consider the sub-factor of commercial use.145 Some forms of
remix are non-commercial by design, and indeed, the definition of fan
fiction sometimes includes that it is non-commercial.146 Writers of fan
fiction have frequently heralded the non-commercial nature of fan fiction
as one of its core virtues.147 Jenkins has discussed some of the ways in
which creators of remix sometimes seek commercial gain. In the past,
143. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 507 (“[N]oncommercial creative uses, precisely because they
are not motivated by copyright’s profit-based incentives, are more likely to contain content that the
market would not produce or sustain. . . .”).
144. See JENKINS, supra note 3, at 150 (describing warnings by Lucasfilm to fans in the early
1980s not to publish erotic Star Wars stories); E-mail from Theodore Goddard, Attorneys for
Christopher Little Literary Agency and Warner Brothers, to unnamed Harry Potter fan (Jan. 22,
2003), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi?action=image_337 (reprinting a
cease-and-desist letter sent to the owner of a website dedicated to Harry Potter fan fiction on behalf
of J.K. Rowling’s literary agency, which expressed concern that children might come across the
sexually explicit content).
145. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (“The first factor
involves examining ‘the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000))).
146. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 655 (stating that part of the definition of fan fiction as “not
produced as ‘professional’ writing”); Fiesler, supra note 91, at 731–32 (“[F]an fiction is understood
to be ‘unauthorized’ and ‘not-for-profit.’”). Tushnet also defines “fanworks” as “noncommercial”
for the purposes of protection under the Organization for Transformative Works. Tushnet, supra
note 130, at 501.
147. See JENKINS, supra note 1, at 158 (noting that even as fan fiction becomes more prevalent,
“fanzines continue to be a mode of amateur, non-profit publication”); Tushnet, supra note 1, at
657–58 (“Fans also see themselves as guardians of the texts they love, purer than the owners in
some ways because they seek no profit. They believe that their emotional and financial investment
in the characters gives them moral rights to create with these characters.”); Fiesler, supra note 91, at
747–48 (describing the “thou shalt not profit” rule as a self-enforced constraint on the fan fiction
community).
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however, these efforts have been relatively insignificant.148 This has been
true for a few reasons: first, due to quality differentials with the
commercial works upon which they are built; second, because of the norm
against commercializing fanworks discussed above; and third, out of fear
that commercial use might occasion unwanted attention from the owners of
the underlying works.149
There have been relatively few litigated cases involving noncommercial uses. As a result, past discussion of fair use of fan fiction and
remix has relied almost exclusively on comparisons with cases such as
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing or the Rocky case.150
Each of these cases involved a commercial defendant. In each case, the use
was found to be unfair. In Bridgeport, a commercially successful musician,
Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, incorporated music samples without
authorization (or attribution) and was found to be an infringer.151 By
contrast, in a fact pattern similar to Bridgeport but involving a one-second
sample used by a child creating an amateur remix, I would confidently
predict that a court would almost surely find fair use. Moreover, I would
speculate that a court would find such a use to be fair even if the use was
only marginally transformative. The consideration of non-commercial use
is a potentially powerful fair use factor and would be a dominant
consideration in cases such as these.
Finally, in addition to being overwhelmingly transformational and noncommercial in nature, fanworks and remix are plausibly characterized as
promoting important educational values, which is a goal explicitly
mentioned in § 107 of the Copyright Act.152
As the above examination of Factor One considerations shows, typical
remix is likely to be both transformative and non-commercial. Given that
Factor One is the most important of the four factors, the above Factor One
considerations count strongly toward the fair use of most amateur remix.
B. Factor Two: Nature of the Copied Work
Factor Two of the fair use test considers the nature of the work that is
copied without owner authorization. The factor has two sub-factors: first,
whether the work is published, and second, whether the work is creative as
compared to factual in nature.153 Much fan fiction and remix culture draw
from unauthorized works that are published, which counts in favor of the
148. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 139–44.
149. Fiesler, supra note 91, at 749 (noting that most fan fiction writers are worried that if
anyone begins to profit from the unauthorized works, it will attract the negative attention of
copyright owners).
150. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2007); Anderson
v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
151. Bridgeport, 507 F.3d at 476–77.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
153. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1245 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The second factor focuses on two different aspects of the copyrighted
work: whether it is published or unpublished and whether it is informational or creative.”).
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putative fair user. Here, the term “published” is used in its standard sense
as a legal term of art in which commercial film, video, book, etc. can all be
said to be published. It is worth noting, however, that the concept is likely
to become increasingly problematic. For instance, if an amateur digital
creator grabs some content from a friend’s Facebook page, has she copied
a published work? Other things equal, the more inclined courts are to see
such works as unpublished, the more their unauthorized use will be
frowned upon by fair use.
Consider the second sub-factor, namely, where the work resides on the
creative versus informational side of the content spectrum. Once again, the
sorts of uses that have garnered the greatest attention thus far are
unauthorized uses of popular commercial content, which is by-and-large
creative in nature. But again, the sorts of uses that are likely to increase in
prevalence are likely to test this distinction. For example, if friend A grabs
a photo from friend B’s Facebook page, what set of criteria is appropriate
to determining whether the borrowed work is informational or creative? To
the extent that such works are deemed creative, other things equal, the fair
use doctrine will frown upon the use.
Suppose the current situation is one in which the predominant number
of borrowed works is both published and creative. In other words, each of
the Factor Two sub-factors points in the opposite direction. In such
instances, courts typically find that the second factor disfavors fair use.
Thus, Factor Two will typically work against a finding of fair use, at least
in the present one and ones similar to it. It is noteworthy, then, that courts
have typically characterized Factor Two as the least important of the fair
use factors.154 Thus, the damage to the fair use bona fides of amateur
digital remix and fan fiction from the application of Factor Two will be
minimal.
C. Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Factor Three takes account of the amount of the underlying work that is
copied as well as the value of the portion taken. Many courts have referred
to the qualitative component as the “heart of the work.”155 There appears to
be no typical case for purposes of Factor Three analysis when it comes to
amateur digital works. Some remix draws heavily from the underlying
works, either quantitatively, qualitatively, or both, while other works draw
relatively little from the underlying works and add much that is creative
154. See Loren, supra note 145, at 31 (“While the Supreme Court has indicated that all four
factors must be considered and no presumptions should be employed, it has become clear in the
case law that often the first and fourth factors dominate the analysis, with the third and second
factors trailing in significance, in that order.”).
155. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985)
(“Next, the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were an insubstantial
portion of ‘A Time to Heal.’ The District Court, however, found that ‘[T]he Nation took what was
essentially the heart of the book.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557
F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983))).
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and original. All else equal, the former category of works will count in
favor of the owner while the latter will count in favor of the user.
Even in those instances in which the third factor might have in the past
counted against second users, courts are increasingly inclined to note that
Factor Three must be judged in light of Factor One.156 In other words, the
more transformative the use, the less that Factor Three is likely to matter.
Following Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and
Campbell, courts and commentators now go so far as to note that when a
work is sufficiently transformative, a use may be fair despite the fact that a
complete copy of the work is used without permission.157 It is noteworthy
that this balancing act typically does not seek to factor in the other subfactor of Factor One besides transformativeness, namely, commercial
versus non-commercial nature of the borrowed work. This is a
consequence of the fact that the issue has nearly always arisen in cases
involving commercial uses. In the context of amateur remix, however, the
underlying factual situation is likely to be different in a relevant manner.
The Factor One sub-factor of non-commercial use would work in tandem
with the transformative element of the use to be set off against the amount
and substantiality of the portion used. In an amateur remix context, then, it
presumably will require less transformativeness than would otherwise be
necessary to offset the Factor Three consideration of the amount and
substantiality of the portion used due to the non-commercial nature of the
fanwork.158 This consideration again highlights the importance of the
amateurishness of amateur-generated content.
In general, however, as we move from a world of fan fiction to a world
of remix, Factor Three will likely play a more important role in influencing
fair use outcomes in a direction unfavorable to fair use. It is reasonable to
predict that the amount taken will be a function of technology, such that as
it becomes less costly to make digital copies of large files such as featurelength films, people will be inclined to make more full-length copies of
156. See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 615–16 (2008) (discussing the various outcomes by courts
using the multifactor fair use test and the importance of one factor over another).
157. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
158. See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449–50 (“[T]he fact that the entire work is
reproduced . . . does not [in certain circumstances] have its ordinary effect of militating against a
finding of fair use.”); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587 (“[R]eproduction of entire work ‘does not
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use’ as to home videotaping of
television programs” (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449–50)). Factor One considerations will not
always trump Factor Three considerations, however. In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, for
instance, the court found that the defendants had taken too much to be justified by the other factors,
including the transformative nature of the work. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,
757 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is our view that defendants took more than is allowed even under the
Berlin test as applied to both the conceptual and physical aspects of the characters.”). Professor
Pamela Samuelson has recently questioned whether Air Pirates would be decided in the same
manner today. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2550 n.70
(2009).
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unauthorized works as their starting point. Compare this situation to that
which pertains to fan fiction in which the creator takes the ideas of the
characters and then does all the writing of the new work on her own using
these characters as grist. The former sorts of uses are more likely to lead to
market harm and thus are less likely to be fair uses. For instance, if one
reads a random sampling of the many thousands of fan fiction works
written using Twilight characters, one will see that they are typically of
such low quality from a market perspective that they pose absolutely no
threat to the market for the original.159 The opposite is true if one starts
from a complete digital copy and removes very little, as the resulting work
will be more likely to have commercial value because the work remains
largely the original work. Other things equal, the more that is taken from
the original and the more substantial the part taken, the more likely there is
to be market harm as a result of market substitution.160 This effect is much
more likely when the creator begins from a full copy of the work as
compared to taking a snippet to use as a small part of a larger whole. Thus,
better technology is in tension with fair use in this respect. Nevertheless,
on the whole, Factor Three will not preclude fair use when works are
transformative and non-commercial, as appears to be the case for the
preponderance of remix works.
D. Factor Four: Harm to Actual and Potential Market
Factor Four takes account of whether the unauthorized use will harm
the market for the original. Because a significant number of remixes are
transformative and non-commercial, they will not harm the market for the
owner’s original work.161 In the case law, there is an inverse relationship
between transformative uses and the Factor Four consideration of harm to
the market of the unauthorized work. In other words, the more
transformative a work, the less likely for there to be market harm because
the works are increasingly dissimilar and thus less likely to compete in the
same market. Campbell notes that,
[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of
the entirety of an original, it clearly “supersede[s] the objects”
of the original and serves as a market replacement for it,
making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original
159. See Lipton, supra note 13 (manuscript at 20).
160. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–88 (“[W]hether ‘a substantial portion of the infringing work
was copied verbatim’ from the copyrighted work is a relevant question, . . . for it may reveal a
dearth of transformative character or purpose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market
harm under the fourth; a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little
added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.”
(quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565)).
161. Id. at 591 (noting that there is only a presumption of market harm in the case of
commercial works, “‘[i]f the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed.
But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.’” (quoting AcuffRose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is
transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and
market harm may not be so readily inferred.162
A parallel case can be made that the more non-commercial a work, the
less likely it is to hurt the market for the underlying work that it uses
without authorization. Indeed, the opposite is increasingly true in
increasingly interesting ways. As Tushnet notes, “[F]anworks encourage
and sustain a vibrant fan community that helps authorized versions
thrive . . . .”163 The connection to fair use is of course that the lower risk
of market harm, the more likely the use is to be fair. Note as well that the
alleged inadequacies in quality of amateur works bemoaned by author
Andrew Keen and others164 would work to make it more likely that the
uses are fair, given that low quality works are less likely to steal a
defendant’s market.
A more difficult question is whether amateur digital works hurt the
market for derivative works. Not all possible derivative works markets are
protected—only those that are reasonably likely to be exploited by
owners.165 Remixes are often idiosyncratic to a particular creator and are
thus not geared toward a reasonable, commercial market. Hence, they are
unlikely to come into disfavor for fair use purposes due to harm to
potential markets.
There is a second point to note that may also work in favor of amateur
creators and perhaps especially creators of digital remix as compared to
traditional fan fiction. Contrary to the implicit suggestion of some
commentary, not all fan fiction and remix are likely to count as derivative
works. Derivative works are “recast, transformed, or adapted” from the
original.166 This characterization will be true for many works built on top
of the original works such that the original works, or elements of them,
such as key characters, remain recognizable and often continue to remain a
large presence in the new work. These sorts of works are plausibly
characterized as transforming, recasting, or adapting the original and thus
may put the creator in the position of being alleged to be an infringer of the
owner’s derivative works right. In other instances, however, it is not apt to
characterize the new work as a “derivative” of the original. For example,
music mash-ups are an important category of remix. Mash-up artists often
use large numbers of unauthorized works in the process of creating their
music.167 For instance, the remixer behind Girl Talk uses tens of
162. Id. (internal citations omitted).
163. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 503.
164. KEEN, supra note 131, at 56.
165. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (“The market for potential derivative uses includes only
those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.”).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
167. See Rob Walker, Mash-up Model—Girl Talk, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), July 20, 2008, at
15 (noting that Girl Talk’s newest collection of songs “is composed almost entirely of more than
200 samples of other artists’ music, ranging from Lil Wayne to Kenny Loggins—none of which
[Girl Talk] has obtained permission to use”).
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unauthorized snippets.168 It cannot plausibly be claimed that the new work
is a recasting, adaptation, or transformation of all or of any one of these
works in particular. This feature should work to the benefit of remix when
it comes to fair use, as fewer of these works can colorably be alleged to
violate the derivative works right because fewer of these works are
derivative.
E. Balancing the Factors
Having considered each of the four factors of the fair use test, the next
step is to balance them. The Copyright Act provides no guidance as to how
to do so. Nevertheless, as noted in passing above, courts have developed
doctrines with regard to the relative weighing of these factors. We saw that
much remix will win on 3.5 out of 4 of the fair use factors, including the
two that courts consider most important, the first and fourth factors.169
Generally speaking, then, remixes are fair uses. To be clear, my claim is
that these uses are fair presently and not just in some counterfactual world
in which a court actually performs a fair use test. I state this in the
Holmesian sense that law is the best prediction of what judges will do.170
My claim is that because judges presented with most examples of fan
fiction and remix as they have existed thus far would find such uses to be
fair, these uses are fair now.
As was seen above, however, not all remix works are fair uses. For
instance, as noted in the discussion of Factor Three above, some amateur
remixes may pose significant threats to the market for the original if they
use too much of the work in proportion to the amount of transformative
change. Additionally, we cannot rely on static analysis because the sorts of
works we are likely to see in the future will in part be determined by the
form of regulation of remix that is adopted. In particular, if amateur remix
is made legal—at least in the manner proposed by Lessig—we could
expect to see an increase in near copies of complete works with only minor
changes. It is quite foreseeable that works such as this could displace the
owner’s market for the original, especially given that Lessig appears to
promote the legalization of commercial as well as non-commercial
remix.171 We see, then, that while there may be a vast number of fair uses,
there are significant unfair uses as well. This fact will come into play in the
next Part. For present purposes, what matters is the overall finding that
much remix is fair use.
Lessig argues that fair use is too complex for ordinary people to apply,
the implication being that legalization will provide a bright-line rule now
lacking under fair use analysis.172 This problem is not solved by making
amateur remixes legal, however, as creators will still need to engage with
fair use law to the extent that their use may—and will typically—implicate
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
See supra Parts III.A–D.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 702 (1998).
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
LESSIG, supra note 5, at 269–71.
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other copyrights. In other words, Lessig’s proposal will not achieve the
bright line to which he aspires. To see this, imagine a type of use that is
likely to be common were amateur remix to be made legal: the Clean
Flicks model of digitizing a movie and then deleting violent and sexually
explicit scenes.173 An example of such a use would be the movie Titanic
without the steamy scene of Kate Winslet topless. Were the owner unable
to sue for violations of its right to derivative works because amateur remix
was legal, the owner could still sue under the theory that this was an
unauthorized copy. The defendant would then proffer a fair use defense,
claiming this use as a transformative remix. There is no reason, however,
that a transformative work cannot also constitute an infringing “copy” as
this term is understood in its technical, legal sense.174 Consider a paradigm
case in copyright law, Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., as
an example.175 In this case, the defendant produced a poster to promote the
film Moscow on the Hudson that the court held was an unauthorized use of
plaintiff’s well-known The New Yorker cover.176 While the poster was
clearly a transformative-derivative work, it was also successfully alleged to
involve elements of exact copying.177 Thus, ordinary users will still need to
be able to distinguish remixes that involve making illicit copies of the
originals from those that do not. The determining factor will typically
involve the fair use test. Thus, fair use doctrine cannot be avoided after all.
In other words, Lessig must acknowledge that producers of remix culture
will not be able to avoid the issue of fair use because any putative user has
to be in a position to determine if making the transformative remix or
derivative work also involves the making of a fair use copy with regard to
the “remix,” qua copy. Thus, again, we see that legalization of remix in the
manner proposed by Lessig fails as a panacea.
F. Lenz v. Universal
In general, one of the problems in discussing amateur remix is that the
topic is so new that directly relevant case law has yet to develop. There is,
however, an exception to this regrettable state of affairs: the recent seminal
case, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.178 It will be instructive to close out
this Part with a discussion of this case because it indicates the potential for
an expanded role for fair use in the context of amateur remix.
Lenz gained a good deal of media attention because it was yet another
173. See Clean Flicks of Colo., L.L.C. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo.
2006) (noting the process by which Clean Flicks deletes “sex, nudity, profanity and gory violence”
from movies and redistributes them).
174. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (providing that a copyright owner maintains the exclusive
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies”).
175. 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
176. Id. at 708–09.
177. See id. at 713–14 (finding “copyright infringement” even where “not all of the details are
identical” because all that is needed is a “substantial similarity that involves only a small portion of
each work”).
178. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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instance in which the commercial copyright industry sued a particularly
sympathetic plaintiff for an act that while technically a colorable instance
of infringement, nevertheless appears to the common person to be
acceptable. The facts of the case, in short, are that an eighteen-month-old
child spontaneously began dancing to a Prince song, and the mother
recorded it on a video and posted it on YouTube.179 Universal filed a
takedown notice pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), the mother objected, and the Electric Frontier Foundation took
the case pro bono after the situation gained attention.180
Interestingly, Lessig begins the introduction to his book with the facts
of this case,181 contrasting it with what he would call a “fair and justified”
use of the law, one in which Universal might, for example, demand the
takedown of a “new television series with high-priced ads.”182 Lessig
argues that in the Lenz case the use of the law is neither fair nor justified
because:
The Prince song on Lenz’s video, however, was something
completely different. First, the quality of the recording was
terrible. No one would download Lenz’s video to avoid
paying Prince for his music. Likewise, neither Prince nor
Universal was in the business of selling the right to video-cam
your baby dancing to their music. There is no market in
licensing music to amateur video. Thus, there was no
plausible way in which Prince or Universal was being harmed
by Stephanie Lenz’s sharing this video of her kid dancing
with her family, friends, and whoever else saw it.183
Lessig brushes aside discussion of any further details of the case, noting
that there will be “plenty of time to consider the particulars of a copyright
claim like this in the pages that follow.”184 However, in the rest of the book
there is no discussion of a case of remix in which Lessig discusses either
fair use or allegations of criminal conduct. Lessig then turns to the larger
point:
What is it that allows these lawyers and executives to take
a case like this seriously, to believe there’s some important
social or corporate reason to deploy the federal scheme of
regulation called copyright to stop the spread of these images
and music? “Let’s Go Crazy”? Indeed! What has brought the
American legal system to the point that such behavior by a
leading corporation is considered anything but “crazy”? Or to
179. Id. at 1151–52; see also LESSIG, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that Ms. Lenz’s son started
dancing upon hearing Prince’s song).
180. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152–53; LESSIG, supra note 5, at 3.
181. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 1–4.
182. Id. at 2.
183. Id. at 2–3.
184. Id. at 4.
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put it the other way around, who have we become that such
behavior seems sane to anyone?185
What Lessig does not discuss, however, is that this case is a
counterexample to his basic thesis about the criminality of amateur remix.
The real meaning of the case is precisely the opposite of that which is
implied by the manner in which the case is represented by Lessig. Lenz
disputed the infringement claim, asserting fair use, and then she sued
Universal for submitting a takedown request to YouTube without first
making a good faith effort to determine whether the use was fair—and
hence authorized under the law.186
Lenz won the case, establishing a potential precedent that could
strongly promote the ability of amateur remixers to show their works. If
courts in other jurisdictions follow Lenz, it will no longer be enough for the
owner of an underlying work to file a takedown demand based simply on
the fact that some amount of her work was used in a remix. In addition, an
owner filing a takedown notice must represent that it has a good faith
belief that the use is not a fair use.187 Given the fair use analysis provided
above showing that much remix is fair use, the obvious but important
implication is that there will be much remix for which commercial owners
of underlying works will not be able to make good faith representations of
infringement. This means in turn that there should be a drop in the DMCA
takedown notices filed by owners such as Universal, particularly for those
cases in which the use is very likely fair and the owner would otherwise
have been able to prevail simply due to the asymmetry in power and
resources between corporate owners and amateur remixers. After Lenz,
taking such actions, if not well supported in terms of fair use analysis, may
subject an owner to a finding of misrepresentation under the DMCA.188
The end result is that this case is strongly supportive of the fair use rights
of amateur remixers.
IV. AMATEUR DIGITAL REMIX: FREE AS IN PERMISSIBLE
Recall why we engaged in the preceding fair use analysis in the first
place. The fact that amateur remix is predominantly fair use goes directly
toward refuting Lessig’s claim that “[r]emixing is criminal.”189 A use that
185. Id. at 4–5.
186. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152–53 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“On
July 24, 2007, Lenz filed suit against Universal alleging misrepresentation pursuant to 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(f) and tortious interference with her contract with YouTube.”).
187. See id. at 1156 (“A good faith consideration of whether a particular use is fair use is
consistent with the purpose of the statute.”).
188. See id. at 1154–55 (“An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a
takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a
misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.”). On the need for fair use safe
harbors generally, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1483, 1502–03 (2007) (suggesting that because of overdeterrence and uncertainty, fair use
should be reformed to recognize certain types of copying as per se fair).
189. See Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1896. Lessig writes that:
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is fair is not an infringement.190 A use that is not an infringement is a
fortiori not a criminal infringement. Accordingly, the fundamental legal
claim undergirding Lessig’s set of arguments is false.
A. No Presumption of Illegality
As noted above, Lessig says almost nothing in Remix about fair use.
The few remarks that he does provide, however, are of great interest
because they tie the doctrine of fair use directly to his criminality
argument. Lessig writes, “Once triggered, the law requires either a license
or a valid claim of ‘fair use.’ Licenses are scarce; defending a claim of ‘fair
use’ is expensive. By default, RW [Read/Write] use violates copyright law.
RW culture is thus presumptively illegal.”191 Lessig’s claim here is
essentially that because amateurs cannot afford to establish fair use, they
are infringers—or rather, presumptive infringers—as their actions are
“presumptively illegal.”
This argument is fallacious. Users are only fairly characterized as
infringers if their use, when evaluated by a court, would fail to pass the fair
use test. It is true that if one is a fair user and is sued, one may, for all
practical purposes, be equivalent to an infringer in the sense that one will
typically not be able to establish one’s fair use status for monetary reasons
and thus will lose by default. Crucially, however, this does not make one
an infringer—or even a presumptive infringer—but rather a fair user who
is not in a position, practically speaking, to vindicate her legal rights. It is
well and good to point to a situation of corporate actors using the legal
system to achieve favorable outcomes despite the actual law on the issue.
But, if anything, this provides all the more reason to insist upon the fact,
and highlight the fact, that most of the amateur uses at issue are indeed fair
and therefore legal. Indeed, it is this very fact that makes the actions of
corporate owners so detestable.
Conceptualizing this point in terms of possible world semantics may
help to clarify what it means to talk about fair use in a context in which
there is almost no established case law to provide a better indication of the
legal status of various uses. Considered as alternative possible scenarios,
there is a meaningful difference between talking about case results as
precedent and considering the status of fair use as a matter of prediction in
a world without precedent. Two different sets of possible worlds are
relevant in the present context.192 In one set, litigants actually go to court

In a world in which technology begs all of us to create and spread creative work
differently from how it was created and spread before, what kind of moral platform
will sustain our kids, when their ordinary behavior is deemed criminal? Who will
they become? What other crimes will to them seem natural?
LESSIG, supra note 5, at xviii.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
191. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 100.
192. See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY 15–20 (1980) (explaining and
defending the use of “possible world” semantics).
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and a fair use determination is produced. Based on the fair use analysis
provided above, my claim is that in these worlds, most amateur remixers
are found to be fair users. In the second set of possible worlds of interest,
overbearing commercial owners harass fair users such that for practical
reasons they stop their use voluntarily or default in a lawsuit. In such
worlds, many potential users would never attempt to undertake fair uses in
the first place, due to the chilling effects of previous actions taken by
owners against fair users. In this second set of possible worlds, courts do
not produce fair use case law. In these worlds, the uses are not held to be
unfair as there is simply no legal determination on the merits. Losing a
lawsuit by default does not turn a fair use into an unfair use.
Moreover, while Lessig claims that remix is “presumptively illegal,”193
he fails to explain what this claim entails. The passive tense of the
statement begs the question as to whom is presuming the illegality. If he is
referring to those worlds where owners intimidate fair users, it is not the
case that there is any presumption of illegality. While the users themselves
would feel that owners have treated them unfairly, this feeling—quite the
opposite of a presumption of illegality—is a reflection of the fact that the
users will have a belief, implicit or explicit, that their use is fair.
Nor is there reason to think that the owners would make such a
presumption. If commercial owners have good lawyers, these lawyers
should be able to dispassionately predict what a court would be inclined to
find with regard to fair use. If I am right that most remix is fair use, then
one would expect owners’ lawyers to reach this conclusion as well.194 It
should be noted as well that courts are not presuming illegality for the very
reason that fair users are practically prevented from seeking to legally
vindicate their fair use claims. Consequently, courts are not even made
aware of the dispute. Thus, they are certainly not in a position to develop a
specific legal opinion regarding fair use—namely, that it is presumptively
illegal.
Summing up the preceding discussion, it is simply a mistake to think
that because some party is not in a position to vindicate a legal right that
therefore the party no longer has this right. So too, if an unauthorized use is
fair, it remains so even if the user is not able to benefit from this otherwise
favorable legal fact, either because the party is intimidated or otherwise
practically disabled from exercising the right. Thus, it is incorrect to think
that remix is presumptively illegal. In other words, Lessig’s crucial
conception of kid remix is incorrect.
B. Fair Use and Criminality
As discussed in Part I, Lessig claims that because remix is criminal, this
will lead to disrespect for the law and more criminal activity. This claim
implicitly relies on an assumption of perfect information. This assumption
is a frequent move in arguments in a traditional law and economic vein,
193. See supra text accompanying note 191.
194. Needless to say, this fact need not deter them from harassing amateur creators, should
they deem it most strategic to do so.
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particularly of a Chicago School variety. While Lessig is intimately versed
in this approach, having taught at Chicago and clerked for Judge Richard
Posner on the Seventh Circuit, he is not a self-identified advocate of the
school, and thus, it is more incumbent upon him to explain why he is
implicitly drawing on the assumption of perfect information here,
especially in light of the fact that the on-the-ground facts suggest the
opposite. “It is not well known that such activities would [potentially] be
criminal. Unless one was specifically knowledgeable regarding intellectual
property law, one would not know whether an unauthorized remix, when
not a fair use and willful, is criminal.”195 Indeed, this claim is so
counterintuitive to common sense that one who believed the law generally
made sense would be inclined to doubt that the rule could be such. The fact
that
[S]uch a rule is so equitably counterintuitive that one would
not expect it to exist, [is a fact that] cuts against the grain of
Lessig’s larger argument. . . . [I]f people are not told that a
certain behavior is criminal, . . . [and are not charged with
crimes by prosecutors for engaging in such behavior], then the
claim that [kids] are suffering the negative effects of being
labeled as criminals [appears without foundation].196
Not only are remix kids not labeled as criminals, except by Lessig,197
but they receive information that would lead them to reasonably conclude
the opposite, were they actually to think about the issue.
Consider the impact of social-networking sites like
YouTube or MySpace. When kids go to these sites, they find
large numbers of amateur videos, many of which remix from
commercial sources to some extent. From this fact, it would
be natural to conclude, if only implicitly, that such videos are
not criminal. These sites are not on the fringes of mainstream
culture—quite the opposite—yet no one is shutting down
YouTube or telling [kids] not to upload videos to it.
Indeed, . . . there are strong social norms supporting remix.
Lessig’s second argument implicitly depends on a general
social understanding that remix activity is criminal activity
and likely to serve as a gateway crime.198

195. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1920.
196. Id.
197. Lessig’s book is published by a non-academic press. This means that Lessig’s arguments
stand to have a greater real-world impact by enriching public debate and hopefully public policy.
This can be a double-edged sword, however, because if I am right that Lessig’s main argument is
wrong, then enhanced public exposure may result in enhanced public harm, namely, a world in
which kids are wrongly characterized as criminals.
198. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1920–21.
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One essential element of a gateway crime is the presence of a social
dimension, such that by taking part in the gateway crime, one begins to
associate with a new group of people who themselves are already engaged
in a wider array of criminal activities.199 By associating with such a group,
one is naturally exposed to more criminal associations and consequently
this leads to criminal opportunities. Fan fiction and remix do not involve
this social dimension, however. Acts of amateur creation have no tendency
to bring kids into greater contact with criminals. Thus, Lessig’s argument
based on the threat of a burgeoning criminal culture blossoming in the
wake of a failure of legislators to legalize remix is also without foundation.
The fair use of significant amounts of remix works also affects Lessig’s
claim that institutions of literacy will be deterred from teaching the sorts of
skills that would promote the flowering of remix culture.200 He offers
almost no direct support for this claim. Rather, it is presented in a
conclusory fashion, apparently drawn from the implicit premises that remix
is criminal and that schools, by their nature, do not teach criminal
activities.201 This argument is faulty. Consider the most compelling
conceptual reason first. The skills that one needs to be a criminal remixer
are exactly the same as those one needs to be a professional remixer
working at places like Pixar or Disney. One cannot teach students one set
of skills without teaching them the other. Art and design schools would by
their nature consider it part of their core mission to teach students the skills
they need to qualify for employment at companies such as these. Given that
for commercial content companies, the shift to digital is a fait accompli at
this point, it would therefore be highly surprising if students were not
learning to create and manipulate digital content. Indeed, if their training is
not in digital design—which, I would suggest, is but a form of remix—
what else would these students be learning? Lessig’s failure to address fair
use leads him astray here; because much remix is fair use and thus legal,
schools have every reason to teach these skills and no reason not to.
Finally, it is worth noting that it is in educational settings in particular that
unauthorized uses are more likely to be fair (and moreover, that to the
extent that Lessig wishes to be committed to a traditional Chicago-style
view of full information, he commits himself to the view that these
potential users should be charged with knowledge of the fairness of their
uses).202
199. Stephen Pudney, The Road to Ruin? Sequences of Initiation to Drugs and Crime in
Britain, 113 ECON. J. C182, C183 (2003) (noting that one of the causes of the “gateway effect” is
social interaction, i.e., meeting people one would not otherwise have met).
200. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 108 (“[T]he law as it stands now will stanch the development of
the institutions of literacy that are required if this literacy is to spread. Schools will shy away, since
this remix is presumptively illegal.”).
201. Id.
202. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (providing that “the purpose and character of [a] use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”
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Lessig’s overall argument for legalization had four premises. The only
one I have contested is the first premise, that “[r]emixes cause no harm.”203
The second premise appears unproblematic. Lessig claims that “[c]reative
practices that cause no harm should not be impeded by the law.”204 This
premise is unobjectionable for a whole range of normative views that
assume that one is free to do as one wishes as long as there is no issue of
countervailing harms to others. This is the famous “harm principle” that is
at the core of Millian consequentialist jurisprudence.205 Nor is the third
premise objectionable. It reads: “Creative practices that produce social
benefits should be promoted by copyright law.”206 This follows from a
basic consequentialist approach, which at its core values welfare-enhancing
outcomes. The fourth premise of Lessig’s argument is also
unobjectionable. He contends that, “Remix culture creates social
benefits.”207 The truth of this claim is seen in passing throughout the
previous discussion. Lessig wishes to draw the conclusion that, “Therefore,
remix cultural practices should not be impeded but instead supported by
legal rules.”208
With regard to the premise that I do dispute, the earlier discussion of
harm in the context of fair use supports this view. Amateur remix culture is
not an unalloyed good such that policy issues never arise or that tradeoffs
never need to be made regarding its regulation. While much remix is a fair
use, not all is. As noted above, the clearest type of harm for which I predict
there would be a significant degree of consensus is the harm to the
exclusive right of copyright that would be possible in a world in which it
would be legal to, for example, make full-length remixes of newly released
feature-length films.209 In stark contrast to traditional fan fiction, these
remixes very plausibly could hurt the market for the originals.
Unfair uses are not frequently talked about but they deserve more
attention because they constitute the other side of the coin in fair use
doctrine. The fair use test is routinely discussed in positive terms; it has
been referred to by such terms as a “safety valve” for copyright law.210 And
while this positive characterization is merited, it is useful to keep in mind
that once one accepts that copyright protection is valid, and that its
should be considered among other factors in determining whether a use is fair and therefore not a
copyright infringement).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20; see also Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898.
204. See Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898.
205. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 3, 14 (Bantam Dell
1993) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
206. See Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898.
207. See supra text accompanying note 23; see also Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898.
208. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898 (emphasis omitted).
209. See supra Part III.B.
210. See Tenn. Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1970)
(quoting John Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832,
832 (1968) as describing the fair use doctrine as a “‘balance wheel and safety valve for the
copyright system’”).
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justification is to promote creativity, then one is by logic committed to the
idea that not all uses are fair and that unfair uses do not promote the goals
of copyright. Accordingly, we must pay attention to the possibility of
significant unfair uses of fan fiction and remix culture going forward.
The above discussion has examined Lessig’s complex set of arguments
all leading to the conclusion that amateur remix should be legalized. In
sum, the arguments for moving away from the present regulatory regime
were unconvincing because amateur remix is not criminal, and thus, there
will be no stigmatizing of a whole generation of kids as criminals. Nor will
institutions of learning suffer. Nor will a more generalized crime wave be
unleashed upon society by rising generations that no longer show a general
fidelity to the rule of law. Thus, Lessig has not provided reasons for
moving away from the present regime. This conclusion is worth dwelling
upon in the teeth of Lessig’s powerful rhetorical strategy of arguing for
legalization in the negative, that is, as a better option than the present
regime, simply because it does not suffer from the defects of the present
regime. Structuring the argument in this manner allows the consideration
as to whether legalization will create other problems to be left unaddressed.
As the preceding examination has demonstrated, however, there are
problems with legalization. In particular, significant uses, now deemed as
strongly unfair by law and informal norms, would go unchecked, as we
saw in the hypothetical example of full-length minor remixes of newly
released films.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the preceding discussion, we are now in a better position to
appreciate the merits of the first policy proposal discussed above, namely,
that a fault standard should be applied to amateur remix. As we saw, fair
use allows us to draw the connection between copyright infringement and
the desirability of a shift from strict liability to fault liability. Fair use has
shifted from being the exception to being the rule in the context of fact
patterns involving amateur digital remix. This means that more often than
not when an amateur makes an unauthorized use, it is not an infringing act.
This implies that typically there will not be a “substantial certainty” of
causing harm when an actor engages in an activity that ends up harming
another. Tort law generally takes very seriously the distinction between
harms caused intentionally as compared to harms caused negligently. The
former are intentional torts and the latter are negligence torts.
As every first-year tort student knows, there are two sorts of intentions
that can satisfy the “intentionally” requirement.211 The obvious sense of
intentional harm is when the injurer has as her overt goal causing harm to
the victim. The second sense is when an injurer takes an action in
circumstances in which causing harm to the victim is “substantially
certain,” although causing this harm is not a goal of the injurer.212 Much
unauthorized copying of the sort we find in the copyright case law was
211. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
212. Id.
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intentional infringement inasmuch as the facts of the cases involve acts of
copying by defendants who were substantially certain to cause harm. This
is because many of these unauthorized uses were commercial and in these
circumstances fair use is unlikely. Indeed, there used to be a per se rule that
commercial uses were treated as presumptively causing harm. Thus, in
engaging in such copying, the copier was substantially certain to cause an
unauthorized use. This is not true for instances in which amateur remixers
use copyprotected material of others. Clearly, these uses are not authorized
by the owner, but that is not the key question. The key question is whether
the use is unauthorized, tout court. As we saw in the last Part, this is not
the case because most amateur uses will be fair use and a fair use is a use
authorized by the law.213
Yet, not all uses by amateurs are fair uses. Some will be unfair because,
for instance, they are little transformed and harmful to the owners’
markets. Thus, when an amateur makes a use unauthorized by the owner,
she risks causing harm but the risk does not rise to the level of substantial
certainty. This shifts those activities by amateurs into the category of
generally socially valuable activities that unfortunately but unavoidably
create risk for others. If one causes harm under these conditions, it will be
by accident rather than intentionally. These are accidental infringements
that are aptly adjudicated under a fault standard. Accordingly, most remix
will be legal in the way that driving down the street is legal. One may
engage in the activity with the freedom with which one engages in other
legal activity, namely, one may do so as long as one does not negligently
harm others in the process. By recognizing the harms as accidental, the law
is de facto recognizing the behavior that caused the harm—apart from the
misfortune that the risk of harm was realized—as legal and acceptable. It is
recognized as having a social value. As a normative matter, it is at the least
permitted. This represents a significant change from the past, in which
copyright infringement has been routinely treated like an intentional tort—
like a punch in the nose. In ordinary parlance, we would say that punching
someone in the nose is illegal. By contrast, accidentally hitting someone in
the nose is only a civil wrong if one fails to exercise due care, in which
case one committed a negligence tort.
Compare the analysis to that provided by Lessig. As we saw above, he
argues that remix uses are “presumptively illegal.” If Lessig were right, this
would mean that a well-informed amateur contemplating an unauthorized
use should presume that the behavior that she was about to engage in was
illegal. But she would be wrong to make a presumption as her expectation
in this regard should properly depend on whether a harm is substantially
certain to result, and if not, whether there is nevertheless a risk of harm,
and if so, whether she is exhibiting due care under the circumstances. If she
reasonably believes that an unauthorized use is not substantially certain,
and that she is being duly careful, then just the opposite of thinking herself
to be acting presumptively illegally, she will reasonably believe herself to
be acting quite legally.
213. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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This, then, is the third way in which amateur digital remixers may be
acting legally. This third way depends on a counterfactual policy shift in
which a fault standard is to be implemented. As we saw above, the first
way in which amateur remix may be legal—Lessig’s way—also depends
on a counterfactual policy regime; one in which remix has been made legal
by statute. It is only the second of the three ways—fair use—by which
amateur-generated remix may be legal now in this world rather than
counterfactually. Of the two counterfactual means in which amateur digital
content might achieve legal status, for all the reasons provided above,
clearly it is my contention that the better choice of the two is the one in
which copyright law adopts a fault standard and proceeds to apply it when
appropriate in disputes involving amateur-generated content.
One response to this argument might be that even granting that it is
persuasive, it nevertheless involves postulating a policy shift that, however,
desirable in principle, is unlikely in practice if for no better reason than that
the current regime of strict liability favors the more powerful, concentrated,
and interested actors, the content industry. There is a large commentary on
why such groups will tend to get their way legislatively.214 This is a serious
point which must be addressed. Fortunately for the fault liability proposal,
there is a compelling response and, moreover, one that favors this policy
proposal over Lessig’s. The public choice point is standardly made in
regard to legislative change, but the policy change I advocate could be
furthered by courts. It was courts that originally shifted the standard from
strict liability to negligence in tort generally, and there is no reason they
could not do the same in copyright. There appears to be no provision in the
Copyright Act that mandates strict liability. No less of public choice
theorists than Richard Posner and William Landes have argued that courts
are able to exercise more autonomy to do the right thing and follow their
judicial consciences than are legislatures.215 They should be encouraged to
do so in the context of amateur-generated content.
Indeed, courts may find it necessary to adopt a set of changes in order to
fully incorporate a fault standard. This Article has set out the basic
argument for incorporation of the fault standard in copyright but much
work is left to be done in order to more fully develop a free-standing tort
theory of copyright, that is, copytort. Most striking, fault liability has
implications for the issue of appropriate damages. In particular, in
214. See Derek J. Schaffner, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension of
Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and
Innovation, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (2004).
215. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 416–17 (2003). Regarding the discussion of whether policy change is more feasible
from a public choice perspective via legislation or through the courts, Lenz is a dramatic example of
the power of courts. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
The DMCA left it unaddressed, and so it is up to the courts as to whether a lack of fair use must be
alleged by plaintiffs. By choosing to make this a requirement, the court was in effect adopting a
fault standard, albeit one that looks to fair use rather than due care as the test for faulty behavior.
This example illustrates that it is perfectly within a court’s ambit to charge plaintiffs with alleging a
lack of due care on the part of defendant in cases involving amateur remix.
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negligence law, punitive damages are not seen as appropriate.216 The
obvious implication for the present context is to question the extent to
which statutory damages as allowed under the Copyright Act are the moral
equivalent of punitive damages. It is of interest to note in this connection
that the Copyright Office, in its Report on Orphan Works, advocates for
the creation of a safe harbor that would prominently feature the elimination
of statutory damages.217 The qualification for inclusion in the safe harbor
incorporates what is in effect a fault standard, as the proffered test is
whether the user of the orphan work made a “reasonably diligent search”
for the work’s owner.218 The arguable application to the present discussion
is to conclude that statutory damages should not be allowed for amateur
digital remix when it is to be judged under a fault standard because
statutory damages function to more strongly penalize injuries just as do
punitive damages in tort generally.
A second apparent implication of taking fault seriously in copyright is
that the issue is raised as to the proper burden of proof regarding fault. In
tort generally, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish the
defendant’s fault. Other things equal, one would expect a parallel structure
to hold in copyright as well, such that the owner must allege the user’s
negligence as part of plaintiff’s prima facie negligence suit. Note the
difference here as compared to the current situation in copyright, in which
the defendant has the burden to establish fair use. This sort of additional
burden on defendant as compared to the situation in tort generally may or
may not be justified for fair use, but regarding the fault standard, again,
other things equal, one would expect the plaintiff to have the burden of
establishing fault in copytort, just as is the case in tort generally.
As these apparent implications of developing more fully a fault liability
theory of copyright reveal, there is much work yet to be done in order to
provide a comprehensive, top-down theoretical account of the connection
between tort and copyright. This more thorough account shall be of interest
in future scholarship as it potentially provides a response to the most
salient rejoinder that can be made to the main claims that have been
advanced in this Article. Specifically, a critic may charge that weighing
factors such as the “transformative” nature of a work or the remix’s
“informational” quality would provide little to no guidance to remixers on
what is legal and will likely result in very fact-based lawsuits that may clog
the courts. As the above discussion indicates, however, further
implications of the fault standard as applied to copyright, such as a safe
harbor for statutory damages and the burden of proof to show fault being
on plaintiff, will have the effect that the cost to a potential plaintiff goes up
and the benefit goes down, so by implication, there will be less incentive to
216. GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 39, at 493.
217. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 80, at 8 (“[W]here the user cannot identify and locate
the copyright owner after a reasonably diligent search, then the system should permit that specific
user to make use of the work, subject to provisions that would resolve issues that might arise if the
owner surfaces after the use has commenced.”).
218. Id.
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sue, that is, less chilling effect on potential remixers. In particular, if
statutory damages are disallowed, then the incentive to sue will, in the vast
preponderance of instances, be diminished greatly as real damages caused
to owners from instances of amateur digital remix will likely be de
minimis. And the law wisely chooses not to concern itself with trifles.
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